Page 195 - Media Effects Advances in Theory and Research

184 PETTY, PRIESTER, BRIÑOL

more effective in a negative than in a positive mood because thoughtful
people overestimate the likelihood of the negative consequence (Wegener,
Petty, & Klein, 1994). Research suggests that the effects of moods on per-
ceived likelihoods are quite specific such that sad moods are especially
effective in increasing the perceived likelihood of sad consequences and
angering states are especially effective in increasing the perceived likeli-
hood of angering consequences (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, & Wegener,
2000). Because of this, more specific types of matching of messages to
emotional states could prove effective in situations in which people are
being thoughtful (e.g., presenting sad arguments to sad people but anger-
ing arguments to angry people).
In addition to biasing thoughts, recent research has shown that mood
states can also affect the confidence people have in their thoughts when the
elaboration likelihood is high. Research in nonpersuasion contexts has
shown that a positive mood can enhance confidence in general knowledge
structures (such as schemata, scripts, and stereotypes), and that happy
individuals rely on these knowledge structures more than neutral or nega-
tive mood people (Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996;
Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000). Similarly, in a series of studies, Briñol, Petty,
and Barden (2001) found that high need for cognition individuals made to
feel sad after message exposure came to have less confidence in the
thoughts they generated during message exposure than people who were
made to feel happy after message exposure. When the message was strong
and elicited mostly favorable thoughts, causing doubt in these thoughts
(via sad mood) led to reduced persuasion relative to causing confidence
(via happy mood). But, when the message was weak and elicited mostly
unfavorable thoughts, causing doubt in these thoughts led to more persua-
sion relative to causing confidence. In contrast, individuals low in motiva-
tion to elaborate (i.e., low need for cognition) simply showed more persua-
sion with happy than sad moods, regardless of argument quality. These
low thoughtful individuals used their current mood state as a peripheral
cue and generalized from their current mood state to the message.
Finally, it is important to note that the effects we have outlined for
mood under different elaboration conditions assume that moods are not
so salient that they are perceived as biasing. When moods are made
salient and people perceive a possible biasing impact, they will often
attempt to correct their judgments for the perceived contaminating
impact of the emotional state (Schwarz & Clore, 1973). This can cause
judgments to move in a direction opposite to people’s intuitive theories of
bias (Wegener & Petty, 1997, 2001). Thus, if people think a positive mood
has a favorable impact on their judgments and they overestimate this bias,
the corrected judgment in a positive mood can be more negative than
the corrected judgment in a negative mood (e.g., Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo, &
Troccoli, 2000; Ottati & Isbell, 1996).