Page 127 - Modern Spatiotemporal Geostatistics
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108      Modern  Spatiotemporal  Geostatistics —  Chapter 5
        deals  with  the  cases  in  which  the  prior  pdf  f s  of  the  map  is  sought  from
        the  general  knowledge  base  £ =  {space/time  statistical  moments  of orders
         1,..., A}  and the base  Q — {multiple-point  statistics  of orders AI, ..., A,,}.
         EXAMPLE 5.1: Assume that  the g a functions  at a point p  include the normal-
        ization  constraint  and the  spatiotemporal statistical  moments, as follows





        where  a  =  1,...,A  accounts for the orders of  the corresponding  statistical
        moments  in space/time.  Then,  the ^-operator  in  Equation  5.7 is given by





        where  the  Lagrange multipliers  are found  by substituting  Equation  5.13  into
        Equation  5.12 and solving for the /x a's at point p  for all moment  orders consid-
        ered  (in this case, N c = A).  In addition to the solution  in Equation  5.13,  other
        approaches  could  also  be  used  to  determine  9£  (see below  section,  "Possible
        modifications  and generalizations of the  prior stage,"  on  p. 118). The  analysis
        is easily  extended to  more complicated situations.  We could,  e.g.,  involve  the
        whole set of  mapping  points p mop, which  leads  to




        or we could  assume a series of  more elaborate g a  functions  such as,






        in which  case  9£ is generally given  by Equation  5.7; etc.  Note  that  the  above
        BME  equation includes the  case of  multiple-point statistics,  as well.  Indeed, as
        we saw in previous sections, the g a  functions  may have the form
                      which  implies the  multiple-point  statistics



        of  orders \j  (j  =  1,2,...,v)',  etc. The BME approach  will  account for  this
        kind  of statistical  knowledge rigorously  and efficiently.




        COMMENT  5.3: Th e epistemic   significance   o f th e situation   studied   i n th e


         above  example   (Eqs.   5.12   and   5.13)   can   best   be   appreciated   if   we   look   at
        the familiar  way   in   which  a   scientific  theory   fails   to   be  constrained  or   de-


         termined by   evidence  (Quine,   1970;   Friedman,   1983).   Lower   level   (or   in-
         ductive) indetermination   (Chapter   1,   p.   16)   consists   in   the   fact   that   we
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