Page 211 - Contribution To Phenomenology
P. 211

204                      DON MARIETTA

              a  large  way  is  yet  to  be  seen.  Cooperation  requires  some  effort  on  both
              sides,  and  those  who  profit  from  the  abuse  of  the  natural  environment
              have  not  always  demonstrated  a  willingness  to  cooperate.  In  some
              situations,  however,  developers  have  been  willing  to  negotiate,  and  when
              they  are  willing,  feminist  social  skills  might be  very  valuable.  Then again,
              will  ecological  feminists  be  inclined  to  engage  in  boycotts?  The  actions
              of  feminists  in defense  of  reproductive  freedom  may  give  some  indication
              of  how  environmental  struggles  would  be  approached.

                                              II

              There are  special  reasons why we  phenomenologists, as  phenomenologists,
              should  take  an  interest  in  ecological  feminism.
                One  affinity  between  phenomenology  and  ecological  feminism  is  in
              the  stress  on  context  in  feminist  ethics.  Warren  has  described  the  ethical
              approach  of  ecological  feminism  as  contextual.  Rather  than  base  ethics
              solely  on  the  implications  of  abstract  principles,  contextualists  look  at  the
              actual  contexts  within  one  acts,  as  they  are  experienced  by  the  people
              involved.  These  actual  experienced  contexts  help  determine  the  ap-
              propriate  behaviors.  My  interest  in  phenomenological  analysis,  more  than
              anything  else,  made  my  ethical  approach  contextual.  Contextual  ethics,
              including  the  contextualism  of  ecological  feminist  ethics,  provides  rich
              examples  of  attending  to  actual  experiences,  which  I  see  as  examples  of
              going  "back  to  the  things" to  test  thought  against  Uved  reality.
                In  my  work  in  ethical  theory  I  have  stressed  the  important  role  of
              individual  world  views  in  the  development  of  moral  beliefs  and  in  the
             assessment  of  moral opinion. Warren seems  to  refer  to something similar,
              if  not  the  same  thing,  when  she  talks  of  "conceptual  frameworks.
             Phenomenology   can  greatly  clarify  our  understanding  of  how  the
             individual's  hved  world  works  in  the  structuring  of  that  person's  view  of
             the  world.  From  an  understanding of  how a  lived  world  is  constituted, we
             can  explain  more  clearly  the  formulation  of  moral  beliefs.  Why  does  the
             racist  not  feel  the  same  horror  which  many  of  us  feel  when  police  beat
             a  person  of  color  unmercifully?  In some  way  the  racist's  beliefs  about the
             inferiority  of  nonwhite  people  affect  a  constitution  of  the  situation  in
             which  what  is  done  is fitting. We  need  to  understand  this  aspect  of  the
             formation  of  values  and  moral  beliefs  as  clearly  as  possible.  The  same
             sort  of  effect  is  at  work  when  \vomen  and  men  constitute  situations
             differently.  Why  do  some  men  find  something  funny  when  most  women
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