Page 215 - Contribution To Phenomenology

208 DONMARIETTA

sensitive'* or "overreacting'' or "taking things too seriously." These lived
worlds of half the human race warrant attention and study. If we
phenomenologists want to really do phenomenology, here is rich material
for study. More important, however, is that this is an opportunity to use
the insights and skills of phenomenology for human betterment.
There is an important contribution which ecological feminism can
make to philosophy and phenomenology through the contextualism and
attention to practical aspects of feminism. Some of us are becoming
aware that philosophers, including phenomenologists, have had a tendency
toward intellectuaUzation of all questions and issues. Even though
phenomenological analysis has shown a close connection between thought,
feeling, and volition, most attention has been given to issues of thought
and cognition. Now feeling, volition, and action are getting a bigger share
of attention. Ecological feminism has opposed the reduction of all
concerns to intellectual discussion. It has avoided separating thought from
the other dimensions of consciousness and active life. Perhaps phenomen-
ologists can learn from ecological feminists. At the very least we have in
feminist thought examples of holistic, integrated approaches to the several
facets of human life.
This integration of thought, feeling, and action has bothered some
philosophers who wanted a priority to be given to thought. It may have
seemed to some thinkers that validation of feeling and attention to
context more than general principles would result in irresponsible
emotionalism and a failure of sound governance of life. That some
people have favored such an approach to life is clear, and distrust of
such a non-rational and anti-intellectual way of hving is justified. Is
ecological feminism such an irresponsible philosophy? I do not think it
is, and any tendency to move in such directions can be corrected. As an
ethical theorist I have defended contextualism and pluralism. The more
threatening approach for many philosophers is pluralism, which holds that
moral principles which cannot be reduced to a common principle or be
shown to be logically derivable from a common foundation may
legitimately be employed in different sorts of situations.
To make this claim responsibly one must explain why this resort to
unrelated principles is justified. This can be done, I believe, by showing
exactly how various situations are different and how several types of
moral judgment are different. It is not too difficult to show that such
activities as deciding what one ought to do, evaluating the past behavior
of oneself or another person, assessing the moral character of a person.