Page 246 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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ETHNIC STUDIES AS      MULTI-DISCIPLINE            239

             phenomenological  whether  or  not  the  researchers  consider themselves
             phenomenologists.  This means  that a great deal of social science  has always
              been  phenomenological,  doesn't  it?  Yes,  and,  while  much  of  what  a
              phenomenologist  may  assert  will  be  familiar  because  akeady  explicit  or
              implicit  in,  say,  sociology, we  think  it  useful  to  try  to  pursue  not  only  an
              explicit  but  also  a  comprehensive  and  systematic  presentation.  This  may
              help  get  some  distortions  and  exclusions  recognized  and  corrected.  For
              example,  negatively  speaking,  there  has  been,  for  generations,  a  great
              deal  of  interpretationism  and  naturalism  in  cultural  science.  Interpreta-
              tion  and  language  are  played  up  by  these  tendencies,  even  though  the
              bulk  of  our  lives  and  interactions,  even  for  intellectuals,  is  non-linguistic
              and, unless "interpretation" is broadened beyond recognition, non-interpre-
              tive.  Stand  back  and  look  at  the  big  picture  and  one  can  see,  positively,
              that  the  valuing  and  willing  by  virtue  of  which  we  have  cultural  objects
              is  neither  linguistic  nor  interpretive.  It  is  often  heard  that  cultural objects
              are  meaningful,  but  is  this  "meaning"  as  in  the  meaning  of  a  word?  Is
              encountering a  chair  as  something on which to  sit  always  and  only merely
              the  interpreting  of  a  physical  thing?
                In  worrying  about  the  big  picture,  one  needs  to  worry  also  about  the
             crucial  distinctions  within  it.  Thus,  how  objects  (which  are  not  just  focal
             objects  but also  situations  and  indeed  cultural  worlds)  present  themselves
             and,  correlatively,  how  subjects  are  intentive  to  such  objects  can  both  be
             analyzed  and  discussed  in  terms  of  awareness  (perception,  recollection,
             expectation,  eideation,  pictorial,  indicational,  and  linguistic  representation,
             etc.)  and  what  Husserl  calls positionality (positive,  negative,  and  neutral
             beUeving,  valuing,  willing,  and  objects  as  intrinsically  and  extrinsically
             believed  in,  valued,  and  willed).  Although  my  stress  is  on  the  distinction
             between  perceiving  or  willing,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  object  as
             perceived  or  as  willed  (its  sometimes  called  the  "ing/ed" distinction), on
             the  other,  might  be  considered  unusual, I  am  using  these  expressions  in
             close  to  the  ordinary  significations.
                Members  of  ethnic  groups  in  conflict  might  believe  that  those  of  the
             other  groups  are  unclean  and  immoral  and  hate  them.  Or,  they might
             believe the  others are supra-moral  and  meta-hygienic  and  envy them  but
             avoid  them  out  of  shame. I  hadn't  thought  of  that,  but  it  fits.  And  this
             is  not  a  matter  of  something  that,  in  one  signification,  might  be  called
             "objective,"  such  as  emumerations  of  how  many  baths  are  taken  per
             capita  per  week  or  how  many  bars  of  soap  one  used,  but  rather  what
             *Sve" believe  (and  value,  and  will,  and  are  aware  of)  about  "them." Or,
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