Page 251 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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244        STANFORD     M.  LYMAN & LESTER     EMBREE

              end-use  and  means-use,  correlating  intentively  with willing  and  being  thus
              different  from  belief  characteristics  and  values  in  objects  as  they  present
              themselves.
                 Probably  the  most  interesting  issue  for  our  concern  is  how  some
              determinations  are  selected  and  used  for  the  recognition  of  people  as
              belonging  to  ethnic  and  racial  groups.  I  could  imagine  most  researchers
              approach  this  in  terms  of  language  and  concepts  or  interpretation,  but
              what  I  would  pursue  is  the  pre-predicative  and  non-verbal  structures  of
              awareness  and  beheving  and  how  these  are  motivationally connected  with
              valuing  and  willing.  One  can  change  the  language  and  the  rules  rather
              easily,  but  it  is  in  these  deeper  areas  of  life  that  change  is  difficult  and
              yet  necessary.  If  there  were  no  problems  at  this  level  of  cultural
              encountering,  language  and  thinking  would  follow  easily.
                The  point  is  that  somatic  and  psychic  artifactual  and  non-artifactual
              naturalistic  determinations  of  various  sorts,  whether  clearly  seen  or  not,
              are  believed  in,  valued,  and  willed  in  different  deeply  learned  (or
              conditioned)  ways  in  different  ethnic  groups.  In  other  words,  they  are
              cultural.  That  they  are  learned  signifies  that  they  are  deeply  habitual,  so
              deep  that  it  can  be  doubted  by  those  who  have  these  habits  that  they
              are  learned  at  all  and  instead  are  believed  to be  natural  in  the  biological
              way,  which  seems  easiest  believed  in  within  traditional  agricultural
              societies  or  at  least  parts  of  societies  concerned  with  such  things  as
              breeding.  In  that  case  people  will  often  fight  to  the  death  over  what  I
              am  trying  in  general  to  describe.
                In  any  case,  perhaps  this  intimates  how  a  philosophical  generalist
              might  attempt  to  deepen  and  widen  the  answer  to  the  question  of  what
              race  and  ethnicity  are.  Note  that  I  did  not  get  into  the  completely
              legitimate  questions  of  the  circumstances  under  which  members  of  an
              own  or  other  group  come  to  have  the  cultural  characteristics  constituted
              in  deeply  habitual  believing,  valuing,  and  willing.  The  first  direction  I
              would  go  in  order  to  develop  an  explanation  would,  however,  be  with
              respect  to  the  structures  of  the  value  system  and  the  use  system  for  the
              group,  the  higher  and  lower  values  and  purposes  it  has,  which  has  to  do
              with  teleological  accounts.  But,  plainly,  one  does  not  have  to  be  engaged
              in  philosophy  to  comprehend  and  examine  whether  what  I  have  outlined
              is  at  all  insightful.  Is  this  analysis  in  terms  of  visible  naturalistic  deter-
              minations  and  their  cultural  characteristics  as  constituted  in  deeply
              habitual  believing,  valuing,  and  willing  by  insiders  and  outsiders  at  all
              relevant?
                /  would say  that  is  a  necessary  feature of  any sound approach to  the
              analyses of race  and ethnicity.  Indeed,  without such  analysis,  I do  not think
              the  work could be pursued.
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