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268                     JAMES a   HART

                Religion  in  the  specific  sense  is  the  higher  level  of  mythic  culture  in
              which

                     these  transcendent  beings  are  absolutized  to deities,  to  the  institutors of
                     absolute  norms which  they  have  communicated  and  revealed  to humans
                     and  in  the  observance  of  which  the  humans find their  salvation  (Hua
                     XXVII, 60).


                On  this  occasion  Husserl  offers  the  opinion  that  the  consciousness  of
              norms  is  what  distinguishes  the  human  animal.  All  animals  live  out  their
              life  in  the  context  of  instincts,  but  the  human  animal  has  not  only
              instincts  but  also  norms  which  pervade  all  conscious  acts  so  that
              everything  she  experiences  is  right  or  not  right,  i.e.,  lovely  or  ugly,
              meaningful  or  pointless,  suitable  or  unsuitable,  etc/  Thus  Husserl  can
              claim  that  the  development  of  the  consciousness  of  norms  and  the
             development  of  religion  are  interwoven.  In  these  passages  he  seems  to
             suggest  that  the  lower  level  of  mythic  culture  is  somewhere  between
             norms  and  mere  instinct.  On  this  occasion  I  will  not  pursue  an  analysis
             of  HusserFs  (rather  impoverished)  view  of  "primitives"  and  their
             religions.^
                In  religion,  as  the  higher  form  of  mythic  life,  all  of  communal  life,  not
             merely  the  realm  of  faith  and  cult,  but  even  the  private  sphere,  is
             harnessed  to  the  requirements  of  divine  norms.  In  "The  Vienna  Lecture'*
             he  holds  that  reUgion  properly  excludes  polytheism  and  that  in  the



             thing."  Similarly  we  can  measure  the  facts  of  historical  religions  against  the  ideals
             emergent  in  religious  experience.  The  truth  of  religion  in  this  sense  would  be
             relative  to  the  various  historical  disclosures  and  irrelative  in  so  far  as  these  would
             be  instances  of  the  ideal  unity  which  is  manifest  in  them.  See  "Correspondencie
             entre  Dilthey  y  Husserl,"  Walter  Biemel,  ed.,  Revista  Filosoia  de  la  Universidad  de
             Costa  Rica  I  (1957),  101  ff.;  translation  in  Husserl: Shorter  Works  (South  Bend:
             Notre  Dame,  1981),  203-208.  See  also  "A  Precis  of  an  Husserlian  Philosophical
             Theology,"  Essays  in  Phenomenological  Theology,  edited  by  Steven  Laycock  and
             James  Hart  (Albany:  SUNY  Press,  1986),  100  ff.
                  *  HusserPs  sketches  of  animal  consciousness  are  worthy  of  a  special  study.
                  ^ It  is  impoverished  because  he  does  not  see  the  richness  of  forms  of  life  and
             collective  virtue,  e.g.,  practices  of  avoiding  conflict,  of  non-violence,  of  child-raising
             and  child-care,  etc.  in  many  aboriginal  cultures.  Everything  is  judged  from  the
             standpoint  of  whether  the  culture  approaches  the  Greek  discovery  of  logos.  It  could
             be  that  a  superior  kind  of  social-political  sophia,  if  not  logos,  is  in  play  in  many  of
             these  cultures.  For  a  sketch  of  Husserl's  own  view  see  Sect.  1  of  "From  Mythos  to
             Logos  to  Utopian  Poetics:  An  Husserlian  Narrative."
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