Page 323 - Contribution To Phenomenology
P. 323

316                      MANO   DANIEL

                     follow  the  paths  I  have  indicated  and  refute  my  explanation  on  the
                     ground  I  have  determined.^


              Now,  it  would  be  easy  to  dismiss  this  false  sense  of  bravado  as  any,
              even  cursory,  reading  of  the  text  will  reveal  that,  at  best,  it  is  a  flawed
              biography.  It  would,  however,  be  a  serious  mistake  to  view  Sartre
              "confession" as  a  renunciation  of  the  biographical  enterprise;  as  a  sort  of
              "reductio  ad  absurdum."  Two  considerations  ought  to  dispel  this  view:
              First,  even  if  Sartre's  interpretation  of  Flaubert  were  inadequate,  any
             alternative  accounts  would  nevertheless  have  to  produce  an  equivalent
              treatment  of  the  life  and  work,  dealing  with  or  refuting  the  same  issues,
             and  hence  traverse  many  of  the  same  paths  that  he  has  explored.  As
             such,  the  passage  is,  in  effect,  a  disguised  challenge  to  alternate  expla-
             nations.  Second,  if  one  draws  a  distinction  between  historical  and
             psychical  reality,  then  the  criteria  for  judging  the  reconstruction  of
             psychical  reality  cannot  proceed  in  a  manner  equivalent  to  that  of
             historical  veracity  since  there  is  a  paucity  of  observable  historical  events.
             Psychoanalytic  constructions  are  not  reducible  to  historically  observable
             events  although  they  are  constrained  or  fettered  by  them.  As  such,  the
             question  of  biographical  veracity  cannot  be  answered  simply  by  the
             adequacy  or  discovery  of  external  facts  but  must  also  involve  questions
             concerning  the  attempt  to  symbolize  the  quality  of  Flaubert's  subjectiv-
             ity.
                Douglas  Collins,  who  defends  Sartre's  turn  to  biography,  argues  that:

                     the  test  of  a  system  of  ideas  lies  in  its  ability  to  perform  in  the  real
                     world,  and  this  ability  is  best  revealed  in  its  capacity  to  reconstruct  the
                     life  of  an  historical  individual.  A  philosophical  system  is  thus  subor-
                     dinate  in  interest  to  the  biography  it  generates,  because  in  the  biography
                     the  system's success  or  failure  is  ultimately  evaluated.  Rather  than  being
                     the  bastardization  of  philosophy,  biography  is  its  legitimation.'*^

             Similarly,  the  attempt  to  produce  a  biography  of  a  unique  individual  is
             also  to  test  the  adequacy  of  the  assumptions,  resources  and  techniques
             employed  and  deployed  in  the  inquiry  directed  at  the  cultural  world.




                  ^^ "On  the  Idiot  of  the  Family,"  132.
                  ^  Douglas  Collins,  Sartre  as  Biographer (Cambridge,  MA.:  Harvard  Univer-
             sity  Press,  1980),  5.
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