Page 89 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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82                     OSBORNE WIGGINS

              charges  of  relativism  will  continue  as  long  as  they  view  the  mind  as
              world-constituting  and  they  deem  this  mind  a  human  mind.
                Early  and  late  in  his  career  Husserl  criticized  anthropologisms  that
              imply  relativism  (Husserl,  1970  and  1987).  His  solution  lay  in distinguish-
              ing  between  essential  (necessary)  features  of  mental  life  and  empirical
              (contingent)  features.  For  Husserl,  philosophy  was  the  science  of  the
              essential;  and  the  empirical  sciences—both  natural  and  social—^were
              disciplines  devoted  to  the  contingent.  Lakoff  and  Johnson make  much  use
              of  findings  in  the  empirical  sciences,  especially  psychology;  and  yet  they
              draw  philosophical  conclusions  from  these  findings.  Aron  Gurwitsch  and
              Merleau-Ponty  also  thought it  possible  to  appropriate  some  of  the  results
              of  empirical  science  ~  Gestalt  psychology  in  particular  ~  for  use  in
              philosophical  reasoning  (Gurwitsch,  1964  and  1966;  Merleau-Ponty,  1962).
              Clearly  there  should  be  some  methodological lines  of  connection  between
              philosophy  and  empirical  science.  The  difficulty  lies  in  securing  those
              connections  in  ways  that  do  not  result  in  a  metaphysical  anthropologism
              and  an  epistemological  relativism.
                The  similarities  between  the  phenomenologies  of  Husserl,  Gurwitsch,
              and  Merleau-Ponty  and  the  experiential  realisms  of  Lakoff  and  Johnson
              are  manifold  and  profound.  The  differences,  I  think,  force  us  to  think
              strenuously  about  foundational  issues  in  both  phenomenology  and
              experiential  realism.  Such  thinking,  if  successful,  could  in  the  long  run
              render  the  similarities  even  more  evident  and  fruitful.

                                          References

              Gurwitsch,  Aron.  The  Field of  Consciousness,  Duquesne  University  Press,
                Pittsburgh,  1964.
              Gurwitsch,  Aron.  Studies in  Phenomenology  and  Psychology,  Northwest-
                ern  University  Press,  Evanston,  1966.
              Gurwitsch,  Aron.  Phenomenology  and  the  Theory  of  Science, Edited  by
                Lester  Embree,  Northwestern  University  Press, Evanston, 1974.
              Gurwitsch,  Aron.  Human  Encounters in  the  Social  World,  Edited  by
                Alexandre  Metraux.  Translated  by  Fred  Kersten.  Duquesne  University
                Press,  1979.
              Gurwitsch,  Aron.  Marginal Consciousness,  Edited  by  Lester  Embree.
                Athens,  Ohio:  Ohio  University  Press,  1985.
              Husserl,  Edmund. Ideen  zu  einer  reinen  phiinomenologie  und  phanomen-
                ologischen philosophiCj Zweites Buch: Phctnomenologische untersuchungen
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