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Basic concepts 117
                As  a common  denominator, the  monetary  value of  losses   sions. This makes accurate failure predictions almost impossi-
              is often used to quantify consequences. Such “monetizing” of   ble. So, modem risk assessment methodologies provide a sur-
              consequences-assigning  dollar values to damages-is  straight-   rogate  for  such  predictions.  Assessment  efforts  by  pipeline
              forward for some damages. For others, such as loss of life and   operating companies are normally not attempts to predict how
              environmental impacts, it is more difficult to apply. Much has   many failures will occur or where the next failure will occur.
              been written on the topic of the value of human life, and this is   Rather, efforts are designed to systematically and objectively
              further discussed in absolute risk quantification (see Chapter   capture everything that can be known about the pipeline and its
              14). Placing a value on the consequences of an accident is a key   environment, to put this information  into a risk context, and
              component in society’s determination of how much it is willing   then to use it to make better decisions.
              to  spend to  prevent that  accident. This  involves concepts  of   Risk assessments normally involve examining the factors or
              acceptable risk and is discussed in Chapter 15.   variables that combine to create the whole risk picture. A com-
                The hazards that cause consequences and are created by the   plete list of underlying risk factors-that   is.  those items that
              loss of integrity of an operating pipeline will include some or   add to or subtract from the amount of risk-can  be identified
              all ofthe following:                       for a pipeline system. Including all of these items in an assess-
                                                         ment, however, could create a somewhat unwieldy system and
                Toxicityiasphyxiation  threats  from  released  products-   one of questionable utility. Therefore, a list of critical risk indi-
               contact toxicity or exclusion of air from confined spaces   cators is usually selected based on their ability to provide use-
               Contaminatiodpollution from released  productsdamage   ful risk signals without adding unnecessary complexities. Most
               to flora, fauna, drinking waters, etc.    common approaches advocate the use of a model to organize or
              0  Mechanical  effects  from  force  of  escaping  product-   enhance our understanding of the factors and their myriad pos-
               erosion, washouts, projectiles, etc.      sible interactions. A risk assessment therefore involves trade-
              0  Firehgnition  scenarios  involving  released  products-pool   offs between the number of factors considered and the ease of
               fires, fireballs, jet fires, explosions   use or cost of the assessment model. The important variables
                                                         are widely recognized, but the number to be considered in the
               These  hazards  are  fully  discussed  in  following  chapters,   model (and the depth ofthat consideration) is a matter ofchoice
              beginning with Chapter 7.                  for the model developers.
                                                          The concept of the signal-to-noise ratio is pertinent here. In
              Risk assessment                            risk assessment, we are interested in measuring risk levels-the
                                                         risk is the signal we are trying to detect. We are measuring in a
              Risk assessment is a measuring process and a risk model is a   very “noisy” environment. in which random fluctuations and
              measuring  tool.  Included  in  most  quality  and  management   high uncertainty tend to obscure the signal. The signal-to-noise
              concepts is the need for measurement. It has been said that “If   ratio  concept  tells  us  that  the  signal has to  be  of  a  certain
              you don’t have a number, you don’t have a fact-you   have an   strength before we can reliably pick it out of the background
              opinion.” While  the  notion  of  a  “quantified  opinion”  adds   noise.  Perhaps  only  very  large  differences  in  risk  will  be
              shades of gray to an absolute statement like this, most would   detectable with our risk models. Smaller differences might be
              agree that quantifying  something is at least the beginning of   indistinguishable  from  the background  noise  or uncertainty
              establishing its factual nature. It is always possible to quantify   in our measurements.  We  must  recognize the  limitations  of
              things  we  truly  understand.  When  we  find  it  difficult  to   our measuring  tool so that we  are not wasting time chasing
              express something in numbers, it is usually because we don’t   apparent  signals  that  are,  in  fact,  false-positives  or  false-
              have a complete understanding of the concept. Risk assessment   negatives. The  statistical quality  control  processes  acknowl-
              must  measure  both  the probability  and  consequences  of  all   edge  this  and employ  statistical  control  charts  to determine
              of the potential events that comprise the hazard. Using the risk   which measurements are worth investigating further.
              assessment. we can make decisions related to managing those   Some variables will intuitively contribute more to the signal;
              risks.                                     that is, the risk level. Changes in variables such as population
               Note that risk is not a static quantity. Along the length of a   density, type of product, and pipe stress level will very obvi-
              pipeline, conditions are usually changing. As they change, the   ously change the possible consequences or failure probability.
              risk is also changing in terms of what can go wrong, the likeli-   Others. such as flow rate and depth of cover will also impact the
              hood of something going wrong,  andor the potential conse-   risk, but perhaps not as dramatically. Still others, such as soil
              quences. Because conditions also change with time, risk is not   moisture, soil pH, and type of public education advertising, will
              constant even at a fixed location. When we perform a risk eval-   certainly have some effect, but the magnitude of that effect is
              uation, we are actually taking a snapshot of the risk picture at a   arguable. These latter are not arguable in the sense that they
              moment in time.                            cannot  contribute to a  failure, because  they certainly  can in
               There is no universally accepted method for measuring risk.   some imaginable scenarios, but in the sense that they may be
              The  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  several   more noise than signal, as far as a model can distinguish. That
              approaches are discussed later in this chapter. It is important to   is, their  contributions  to  risk  may  be  below  the  sensitivity
              recognize what a risk assessment can and cannot do, regardless   thresholds ofthe risk assessment.
              of the methodology employed. The ability to predict pipeline
              failures-when   and where they will occur-would  obviously   Risk management
              be a great advantage in reducing risk. Unfortunately, this can-
              not be done at present. Pipeline accidents are relatively rare and   Risk management is a reaction to perceived risks. It is practiced
              often involve the simultaneous failure of several safety provi-   everyday by  every individual. In operating  a  motor vehicle,
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