Page 36 - Pipeline Risk Management Manual Ideas, Techniques, and Resources
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Risk assessment issues 1/15

                                                   Ignition             (1/600)   Detonation
                               (1/100)  Large                           (500/600) High thermal
                                     rupture                                     damages
                                          1 (29/30)
                                                   No ignition          (99/600)  Torch fire only














                      equipment-
                       contacts                                                    (1/20)  Corrosion
               Third-   line
                party -                     (6/10)
                                                            [                survey
              damage   (1  :2 years)        - - - - - - - - - -
                                                   Reported
                                                            @/lo) Cathodic
                                            (4/10)   Unreported   1t;;ion
                                                                                          leak
                                                            (2/10)






                               (’/’  O0) No damage - No event
                                              Figure 1.3  Event-tree analysis


              how  quickly  the interrelationships  make  an  event tree  very   jectivity and judgment and should be carefully documented.
              large  and  complex.  especially  when  all  possible  initiating   While a screening analysis is a logical process to be used
              events are considered. The probabilities associated with events   subsequent to almost any risk assessment, it is noted here as a
              will also normally be hard to determine. For example, Figure   possible  stand-alone  risk tool. As  such,  it  takes  on  many
              1.3 suggests that for every 600 ignitions of product from a large   characteristics of the more complete models to be described,
              rupture.  one  will  result  in  a  detonation,  500  will  result  in   especially the scoring-type or indexing method.
              high  thermal  damages,  and  99  will  result  in  localized  fire
              damage only. This only occurs after a Ym chance of ignition,   VII.  Risk assessment issues
              which occurs after a Yim chance of a large rupture, and after a
              once-every-two-years  line  strike.  In  reality,  these  numbers   In comparing risk  assessment approaches,  some issues arise
              will  be difficult  to estimate.  Because the probabilities  must   that can lead to confusion. The following subsections discuss
              then be combined (multiplied) along any path in this diagram,   some ofthose issues.
              inaccuracies will build quickly.
                                                         Absolute vs. relative risks
              0  Screening  analyses. This  is  a  quantitative  or  qualitative
               technique  in  which  only  the  most  critical  variables  are   Risks can be expressed in absolute terms, for example, “num-
               assessed. Certain combinations of variable assessments are   ber  of  fatalities  per  mile  year  for  permanent  residents
               judged to represent more risk than others. In this fashion, the   within one-half mile of pipeline. . . .” Also common is the use
               process acts as a high-level screening tool to identify rela-   of  relative  risk  measures,  whereby  hazards  are  prioritized
               tively risky portions of a system. It requires elements of suh-   such that the examiner can distinguish which portions of the
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