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17 Social Constraint                                            433

              It will now be examined how current architectures can be assessed from an empir-
            ical perspective. As the examination of current simulation models has revealed, a
            comprehension of the effects of the social level on individual agents is far from being
            sufficient so far. To provide an outlook of possible future modelling approaches
            of the effects of social norms on individual agents, a brief sample of normative
            agent architectures will be provided. In fact, the number of conceptually oriented
            articles on the architecture of normative agents exceeds the number of existing
            models. These architectures study how these processes could be modelled in
            principle. Typically, norms in concrete models are less sophisticated than concepts
            proposed in formal architectures (Conte and Dignum 2001). The development of
            architectures is a kind of requirement analysis: it specifies the essential components
            of normative agents. It can be expected that future implementations will be guided
            by deliberations that can be found in these architectures. For this reason, a sample
            of cases is selected (Neumann 2008a) for a closer examination with regard to
            the question of what decisions are made on how to represent effects of norms on
            individual agents.

            Andrighetto et al. (2007) investigate the process of norm innovation. The behaviour
              of an agent may be interpreted by an observing agent as normative if it is marked
              as salient in the observer’s normative board. Thus, norm instantiation is regarded
              as an inter-agent process.
            Boella and van der Torre (2003) differentiate between three types of agents: agents
              who are the subject of norms, so-called defender agents, who are responsible
              for norm control and a normative authority that has legislative power and that
              monitors defender agents.
            Boella and van der Torre (2006) rely on John Searle’s notion of institutional
              facts (so-called ‘counts-as’ conditionals) to represent social reality in the agent
              architecture. A normative base and a ‘counts-as’ component transforms brute
              facts into obligations and permissions.
            The Belief-Obligation-Intentions-Desire (BOID) architecture (Broersen et al. 2001)
              is the classical approach to represent norms in agent architectures. Obligations
              are added to the BDI architecture to represent social norms while preserving the
              agent’s autonomy. Principles of the resolution of conflicts between the different
              components are investigated in the paper.
            Boman (1999) proposes the use of supersoft decision theory to characterise real-
              time decision-making in the presence of risk and uncertainty. Moreover, agents
              can communicate with a normative decision module to act in accordance with
              social demands. Norms act as global constraints on individual behaviour.
            Castelfranchi et al. (2000) explore the principles of deliberative normative reason-
              ing. Agents are able to receive information about norms and society. The data
              is processed in a multi-level cognitive architecture. On this basis, norms can be
              adopted and used as meta-goals in the agent decision process.
            Conte and Castelfranchi (1999) distinguish between a conventionalist (in rational
              philosophy) and a prescriptive (in philosophy of law) perspective on norms. A
              logical framework is introduced to preserve a weak intuition of the prescriptive
              perspective which is capable of integrating the conventionalist intuition.
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