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17.3.1 The Perspective of Socialisation Research on Norms

To grasp an understanding of the decisions that have to be made in the cognitive
design of an agent, first, some fundamental aspects of theories of socialisation
are briefly highlighted. Subsequently, current architectures of normative agents are
evaluated with regard to the questions posed by the empirical science.
Broadly speaking a conceptual dichotomy of two main approaches can be
identified (Geulen 1991) in socialisation research concerning the relation between
the individual and society: One position assumes a harmony between, or identity of,
the individual and society. Philosophical precursors of this approach are Aristotle,
Leibniz and Hegel. The second position stands in contrast and postulates an
antagonism between the individual and society. Within this position, two further
standpoints can be distinguished already in the philosophical tradition: Hobbes, for
example, is representative of the argument that society should tame the individual.
By contrast, the position of Rousseau is paradigmatic of an approach that advocates
the need for releasing the individual from society. Both philosophers share the
assumption that an antagonism exists between the individual and society, although
they disagree about the implications.
As it has been outlined, socialisation research sits at the border of psychology
and sociology, and contributions from both disciplines can be found in the litera-
ture. From a sociological perspective, the beginning of investigating socialisation
processes cumulated in the work of Emil Durkheim, founding father of sociology
and professor of pedagogy. Starting from a clinical and psychological perspective,
Sigmund Freud developed a theory of socialisation, which in many aspects is
surprisingly akin to Durkheim’s approach.
The early theories of Freud and Durkheim agree in that they assume an antago-
nism between individual and society. Durkheim asserted that the individual consists
of two parts: first, a private domain that is egoistic and guided purely by basic drives.
The egoistic domain corresponds to that of the newborn child. The original human
is a ‘tabula rasa’ in which social norms have to be implemented. Only through
the process of socialisation do humans become socially and morally responsible
persons. This is the second ‘part’ of the individual. Durkheim claimed that the best
of us is of a social nature. Society, however, is coercive (Durkheim 1895) and can
even compel individuals to commit suicide (Durkheim 1897). Norms are finally
internalised once the individual no longer perceives this coercion (Durkheim 1907).
Yet for Durkheim coercion nonetheless remains. As with Durkheim, Freud assumed
the existence of an antagonism between individuals and society. This assumption
can be discerned in his distinction between ego, id and superego. The id represents
the drives of the child-like portion of the person. It is highly impulsive and takes
into account only what it wants. It exclusively follows the pleasure principle (Freud
1932). The superego enables control of the primary drives: it represents the moral
code of a society and involves feelings of shame and guilt (Freud 1955). It is the
place where social norms can be found. It has been argued that the degree to which
feelings of guilt are experienced is indicative of the degree of norm internalisation