Page 422 -

17 Social Constraint 425

Saam and Harrer (1999) present a further extension of Conte and Castelfranchi’s
model. They investigate the influence of social inequality and power relations on
the effectiveness of a ‘finder-keeper’ norm.
Epstein (2000) examines the effect of norms on both the social macro- and the
individual micro-level. On the macro-level, the model generates patterns of local
conformity and global diversity. At the level of the individual agents, norms have
the effect of relieving agents from individual thinking.
Flentge et al. (2001) study the emergence and effects of a possession norm by
processes of memetic contagion. The norm is beneficent for the society but has
short-term disadvantages for individual agents. Hence, the norm can only be
retained in the presence of a sanctioning norm.
Verhagen (2001) tries to obtain predictability of social systems while preserving
autonomy on the agent level through the introduction of norms. In the model, the
degree of norm spreading and internalisation is studied.
Hales (2002) extends the Conte/Castelfranchi model by introducing stereotyping
agents. Reputation is projected not on individual agents but on whole groups.
This works effectively only when stereotyping is based on correct information.
Even slight noise causes the norms to breakdown.
Burke et al. (2006) investigate the emergence of a spatial distribution of a binary
norm. Patterns of local conformity and global diversity are generated by a
decision process which is dependent on the local interactions with neighbouring
agents.

The contribution of these models to the questions specified above can be
summarised in Table 17.2, which also includes a brief remark on the implementation
specification.

Lessons

The classical model of this kind of models is the one developed by Conte and
Castelfranchi in 1995. It was the starting point for several extensions. While the
scope of these models has been significantly extended in the past decade, the most
significant contribution of this approach still can be regarded as to enhance the
understanding of the operation and effects of normative behaviour constraints.
Epstein, Burke et al. and Verhagen do not study specific norms but examine
mechanisms related to the operations of norms. In particular, the spreading of
norms is studied by these authors. In this respect, they recover and refine (by the
notion of local conformity and global diversity, a pattern that cannot be found
in game theoretic models) the findings of game theoretic models with the means
of cognitive agents. The other models concentrate mainly on studying the effects
and operations of specific norms in the society. Analysed are questions such as the
effect of possession norms, for instance, under the condition of social inequality and
power relations. This is strongly influenced by Conte and Castelfranchi’s problem
exposition.