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17 Social Constraint 435

Table 17.3 A categorisation of approaches: constraints, obligations and abstract concepts
Constraints Obligations Abstract concepts
Garcia-Camino et al. (2006) Sadri et al. (2005) Dignum et al. (2002)
Boman (1999) Broersen et al. (2001) Andrighetto et al. (2007)
Shoham and Tennenholtz Boella and van der Torre Conte and Dignum (2001)
(1992) (2006)
Lopez and Marquez (2004)
Boella and van der Torre
(2003)
Conte and Castelfranchi
(1999)
Vazquez-Salceda et al. (2005)
Castelfranchi et al. (2000)

in interaction processes. This may be sufficient for practical purposes. However,
it follows that it is not possible to distinguish the norm from the normal. Hence,
even though norms cannot be in contrast to individual desires in this account, the
agents have no concept of obligations. They do not ‘know’ norms. Agents have a
purely passive role. Since no decisions are possible, they remain merely normative
automata.

17.3.2.2 Obligations

More sophisticated accounts treat norms as mental objects (Castelfranchi et al. 2000;
Conte and Castelfranchi 1995a, b). This allows for deliberation about norms and, in
particular, for the conscious violation of norms. Norms intervene in the process
of goal generation, which might—or might not—lead to the revision of existing
personal goals and the formation of normative goals. A number of accounts (such
as the BOID architecture) rely on the notion of obligations. Obligations are explicit
prescriptions that are always conditional to specific circumstances. One example
of an obligation is not being permitted to smoke in restaurants. The rationale for
including a separate obligation component next to a component of individual desires
is geared towards ensuring an agent’s autonomy: by explicitly separating individual
and social desires, it is possible that the agent can deliberate over which component
has priority. Conflicts may arise between different components. Compared to the
literature on socialisation, a partial convergence with older theories can be observed.
In particular, it is striking that Freud’s architecture of the human psyche has some
parallels to BOID agents: the Id, guided by egoistic drives taking into account
only what it wants, can be found in the ‘desires’ component. Moreover, there is an
obvious temptation to identify Freud’s superego with the ‘obligations’ component.
In fact, ‘obligations’ have been explicitly described as the desires of a society
(Dignum et al. 2002). This conception is well supported by Freud’s theory. With
regard to current identity theories and the theory of self-determination, the situation