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THE PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGY: MARXISM WITHOUT GUARANTEES 35

              Now this circuit can be construed, ideologically, in different ways. This
            is  something  which  modern  theorists  of  ideology  insist  on,  as  against  the
            vulgar  conception  of  ideology  as  arising  from  a  fixed  and  unalterable
            relation  between  the  economic  relation  and  how  it  is  ‘expressed’  or
            represented in ideas. Modern theorists have tended to arrive at this break
            with a simple notion of economic determinacy over ideology through their
            borrowing  from  recent  work  on  the  nature  of  language  and  discourse.
            Language  is  the  medium  par  excellence  through  which  things
            are  ‘represented’  in  thought  and  thus  the  medium  in  which  ideology  is
            generated and tranformed. But in language, the same social relation can be
            differently  represented  and  construed.  And  this  is  so,  they  would  argue,
            because language by its nature is not fixed in a one-to-one relation to its
            referent  but  is  ‘multi-referential’:  it  can  construct  different  meanings
            around what is apparently the same social relation or phenomenon.
              It  may  or  may  not  be  the  case,  that,  in  the  passage  under  discussion,
            Marx  is  using  a  fixed,  determinate  and  unalterable  relationship  between
            market exchange and how it is appropriated in thought. But you will see
            from what I have said that I do not believe this to be so. As I understand it,
            ‘the market’ means one thing in vulgar bourgeois political economy and the
            spontaneous consciousness of practical bourgeois men, and quite another
            thing  in  marxist  economic  analysis.  So  my  argument  would  be  that,
            implicitly, Marx is saying that, in a world where markets exist and market
            exchange dominates economic life, it would be distinctly odd if there were
            no  category  allowing  us  to  think,  speak  and  act  in  relation  to  it.  In  that
            sense,  all  economic  categories—bourgeois  or  marxist—express  existing
            social relations. But I think it also follows from the argument that market
            relations are not always represented by the same categories of thought.
              There is no fixed and unalterable relation between what the market is,
            and how it is construed within an ideological or explanatory framework.
            We  could  even  say  that  one  of  the  purposes  of  Capital  is  precisely  to
            displace  the  discourse  of  bourgeois  political  economy—the  discourse  in
            which  the  market  is  most  usually  and  obviously  understood—and  to
            replace  it  with  another  discourse,  that  of  the  market  as  it  fits  into  the
            marxist schema. If the point is not pressed too literally, therefore, the two
            kinds  of  approaches  to  the  understanding  of  ideology  are  not  totally
            contradictory.
              What, then, about the ‘distortions’ of bourgeois political economy as an
            ideology?  One  way  of  reading  this  is  to  think  that,  since  Marx  calls
            bourgeois  political  economy  ‘distorted’,  it  must  be  false.  Thus  those  who
            live  their  relation  to  economic  life  exclusively  within  its  categories  of
            thought and experience are, by definition, in ‘false consciousness’. Again,
            we  must  be  on  our  guard  here  about  arguments  too  easily  won.  For  one
            thing,  Marx  makes  an  important  distinction  between  ‘vulgar’  versions  of
            political economy and more advanced versions, like that of Ricardo, which
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