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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
March 5 and 6, in which the Jashari family was eliminated. Only one
week before the outbreak of violence, Robert Gelbard, the U.S. spe-
cial representative to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), trav-
eled to Pristina and Belgrade, where he made a number of concessions
to the FRY for its cooperation over Bosnia. He also explicitly called
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) a terrorist organization. While the
West sought more autonomy for Kosovo, the concessions were clearly
another move toward the normalization of relations with the FRY—a
process that began in 1996. Only two weeks later on March 9, 1998,
however, the United States was at the forefront of reintroducing new
sanctions, while withdrawing the concessions it had offered earlier. A
review of the period between these two policy moves reveals that only
one major event in Kosovo occurred—the Drenica massacre.
A similar policy shift occurred between late September and mid-
October 1998 after the Gornje Obrinje massacre. The latest Western
policy shift on Kosovo before the massacre was formalized on
September 23 and 24, through UN Security Council Resolution
1199 and a NATO activation warning. These actions, which resulted
from weeks of negotiations, represented a strengthening of the policy
position against the FRY, in comparison to the policy during July and
August. Yet within two weeks of the Gornje Obrinje massacre, this
already-strengthened stance was again escalated by a NATO activation
order on October 13, making air strikes imminent unless the FRY
pulled troops back and agreed to international monitoring. In review-
ing the activities over the period between the NATO activation warn-
ing and activation order, only one incident clearly stands out—the
Gornje Obrinje massacre and reactions to it. In fact, the genesis of
Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy, which was eventually backed up with
the activation order, was the emergency National Security Council
(NSC) meeting called in the United States the day after images of
Gornje Obrinje reached the West.
Perhaps the starkest example of policy shift in relation to media
images and framing occurred after the Racak massacre of January 15,
1999. On that very day, unaware of the events almost 5,000 miles away,
the NSC was meeting in the basement of the White House to discuss
Kosovo. Despite protests by Albright for a tougher policy, a decision
was made to largely maintain the status quo, with only minor revisions
to the existing policy. Only four days later, however, Kosovo policy
experienced the most dramatic shift toward war since the beginning of
hostilities ten months earlier, adopting a position that envisioned a
Kosovo protectorate secured by NATO peacekeepers—a policy that
would be enforced militarily if necessary. At the January 19 meeting,