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CONCLUSION
important to note that they were based on temporary windows of
opportunity created within an emotional climate. Albright and her
team of advisors seemed cognizant both of this reality and of the fact
that if policy were not pushed forward during such occasions, the
opportunity could be lost as the emotions surrounding the events
evaporated. After Racak, for example, they realized that the galvaniz-
ing effect of the massacre would not last long; as one advisor stated,
“Whatever threat of force you don’t get in the next two weeks you’re
5
never getting, at least until the next Racak.”
The post-Racak period was reminiscent of the post-Srebrenica
period, when a sense of frustration with the failings of existing policy
allowed opportunities for those proposing a tougher, more interven-
tionalist policy to gain bargaining power and push their agenda. Just
as Racak gave Albright the leverage needed to push for military inter-
vention in Kosovo, Srebrenica gave Anthony Lake weight to press for
6
a tougher U.S. Bosnia policy in July 1995. The policy became the
basis for the bombing of Bosnian Serb positions several months later.
Furthermore, the climate created during such periods often pushed
politicians and institutions to using rhetoric that would set them on a
path they might not have endorsed in less passionate times. Once they
were associated with these new positions, however, concern over
maintaining credibility meant that they could not retreat, even at the
risk of putting themselves in an endgame that made confrontation
unavoidable. In some cases, such outcomes could have been reac-
tionary, with unforeseen consequences. At other periods, however,
the outcomes may very well have been a deliberate and calculated tactic
to gain advantage over rivals in the competitive policy environment.
According to an Albright aide, there was a conscious effort to “lead by
rhetoric,” after the Drenica massacre, in order to bring NATO
allies, the American public, and, most important, other members of
the NSC, on side. Not surprisingly, Albright’s statements at this
time created anxiety in the Pentagon and White House. According to
a colleague, Sandy Berger was particularly concerned that Albright
was promising more than the president was willing to deliver. 7
Regarding the relationship between images leading to the CNN
effect and official policy, the case study demonstrated that certain
images could take on a chameleon-like quality, shifting from being a
challenge to official policy to becoming propaganda supporting offi-
cial policy, once policy changed. The Racak images, for example, chal-
lenged official policy (which was Status Quo Plus on January 15,
1999) when they emerged on January 16, 1999. Once the NSC and
President Clinton endorsed the new tougher policy, those same