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CONCLUSION
the West demanded only a withdrawal of certain FRY forces and
negotiations for a political settlement. After Gornje Obrinje, demands
for troop withdrawal and a political settlement were accompanied by
a 2,000-strong Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) monitoring regime. After Racak, the Rambouillet Accords
stipulated an interim political settlement and full military withdrawal
in addition to NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. Additionally,
Chapter VII, Appendix B, point 8 of the accords stated,
NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, air-
craft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded
access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial
waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac,
maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for
9
support, training, and operations.
Some analysts interpreted the inclusion of this point as a causa belli.
The accumulating aspect of the CNN effect on a particular issue,
which in this book was the Kosovo crisis, also provides a useful insight
into research methodology in this area. Much of the case-study-based
research on the CNN effect compares media coverage to policy over
relatively short periods, such as several weeks or months. As this case
study demonstrates, however, while incremental policy changes are
detectable in short episodes, significant shifts, including those involv-
ing strategic policy, often take much longer to unfold. Furthermore,
the accumulating nature of the CNN effect suggests that repetitive
episodes can increase the pressure for policy change. This argument
challenges much of the conventional thinking on this issue, which
suggests a growing numbness to human suffering with repeated expo-
sure to such images.
In the civil war between FRY forces and the KLA from late
February 1998 to late March 1999, two battles raged. The first was
the actual fighting on the ground; the second, which ultimately
proved to be more important, was fought over the hearts and minds
of outsiders. By gaining outside intervention, the KLA hoped to tilt
the balance of power against a stronger FRY force on the ground.
Concluding Remarks
Kosovo Albanian insurgency against stronger Serb rule was not unique
to the last decade of the twentieth century. When Serbia conquered
Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War of 1912,

