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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
from the Serbian side. The failure of each solution was marked by the
onset of the next massacre, symbolizing the previous policy’s inability
to solve the problem.
The second important insight that this case study demonstrated was
that the CNN effect can have an accumulating character, becoming
more important to the media and powerful to the government over an
extended period with repeated episodes of government policy failure, as
manifested by media portrayals. In terms of its growing importance to
the media, over the 15-month period under review, each of the three
massacres drew greater media attention than the previous one, as
demonstrated by the prominence it was given as the leading story.
Although after the first massacre in Drenica, only 19 percent of
American television coverage prioritized it as the leading story, by
Racak, this figure had increased to 70 percent. Also, media framing over
these three incidents became increasingly pro Albanian, increasing from
41 percent to 86 percent. To American audiences, the Kosovo civil war
was being presented as a crisis that was growing in importance while
increasingly becoming the fault of one party—the Serbs.
In terms of its accumulating impact on government activity, several
indicators suggest that each massacre made the Kosovo crisis more
significant to Western governments. One simple measure that illus-
trated this trend, of course, was the rising incidence of Kosovo-specific
government activity. By totaling all Kosovo-specific government
actions, as defined in this study, during the one-month period after
each massacre, there was clearly a growing trend, which grew from
17 actions after the Drenica massacre to 30 after Racak. More signifi-
cant, however, was the degree by which the West was willing to risk
using military force to solve the Kosovo problem. The use of force is
the ultimate price any state can pay for political objectives. An increase
in the propensity to use force, therefore, is a strong proxy of the seri-
ousness bequeathed on an issue. An assessment of the period reviewed
in this case study, especially after each massacre, shows an increasing
willingness to employ the language of military force. After the first
massacre, Western states were clearly not prepared to consider force
seriously. After the Gornje Obrinje massacre, force was considered
strongly, although somewhat half-heartedly, as much opposition was still
present in a number of NATO member states, including the United
States. After Racak, willingness to use force increased significantly, as
much of the opposition diminished. Another factor that further
increased the likelihood of military confrontation and demonstrated
the West’s growing willingness to risk such an outcome was the esca-
lation in the demands made of the FRY government. After Drenica,