Page 54 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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DEMONSTRATING THE CNN EFFECT
particular path . . . [becoming] a significant factor in influencing
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policymakers’ decisions to act.” The strong CNN effect also assumes
that a substantial degree of media coverage is needed before a policy can
yield to media pressure on policy decision–makers and shift in support
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of intervention. This requirement, in effect, places a fourth condition
on Robinson’s strong CNN effect. If smaller quantities of media
coverage incline policymakers to act, rather than create a political
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imperative to do so, then a weak CNN effect comes into play.
The policy-media interaction model is a more systematic account
of the CNN effect than previous efforts, and it incorporates a number
of variables as prerequisites for such a classif ication. Its reliance on
policy uncertainty, its use of case studies over relatively short periods,
and its failure to systematically account for policy change (or the
“effect” of the CNN effect) within the model, however, are all areas
for potential improvement.
Regarding policy certainty, Robinson’s goal of applying a system-
atic approach through a subsystem analysis of policy is a significant
improvement over past attempts that relied heavily on policy decision–
maker recollection and opinion. But this method is often not fully
applied in Robinson’s case studies. Instead, Robinson relies on
opinions from secondary sources and interviews with policy decision–
makers. These sources, however, as Robinson himself pointed out in
his critique of interview-based approach, are not systematic and often
rely on subjective judgment calls that are not consistently applied
across case studies. According to Robinson, “policy maker’s assess-
ments of what is, and what is not, important with regard to any given
decision is largely a matter of interpretation and perspective.” 49
In Operation Restore Hope involving U.S. intervention in Somalia,
for example, Robinson argues that there was policy uncertainty because
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there was no policy of intervention. But the lack of a policy of military
intervention does not mean that there was no policy—it just means that
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there was a different policy in place. The policy before the decision to
intervene militarily with 28,000 troops was one of nonmilitary inter-
vention using aid flights. As Robinson attests, “in August 1992, Bush
ordered a major airlift of relief supplies, an operation that was still going
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on come November.” This was clearly a policy. While uncertainty over
the U.S. policy before November 1992, according to Robinson’s
model, could have been determined through a subsystem analysis, such
an analysis was never presented in the case study. 53
There is also no subsystem analysis in the case study on Operation
Provide Comfort involving U.S. intervention in northern Iraq. 54
Instead, Robinson states that there was policy certainty in the Bush