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THE CNN EFFECT IN ACTION
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Michael Howard has described Clausewitz’s definition as
war.”
operational strategy and has expanded on the concept by adding three
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If the CNN
other dimensions: logistical, social, and technological.
effect has an impact on this pillar of the trinity, then evidence is most
likely to be found in operational strategy and tactics.
There are at least two ways in which the CNN effect is alleged to
impact strategy. These have been described briefly under the impedi-
ment effect previously but will be reviewed in more detail in the
context of the execution of military strategy in this section. The first
way in which the CNN effect can endanger operations is through the
disclosure of sensitive information. As mentioned before, the infor-
mation disclosed by media networks reaches an international audience
that includes adversaries. Therefore, if sensitive information is
divulged, military operations and personnel are put at risk. Even rudi-
mentary pieces of information such as a battlefield unit’s type, size,
equipment, capabilities, and location can provide invaluable intelli-
gence to the experienced commander about the adversary’s likely plan
of action. Such information may appear mundane to an inexperienced
journalist who may inadvertently present it, not knowing the full con-
sequences. Furthermore, given the increasing multinational character
of the media, a reporter not from a country fighting the war may be
under intense competitive pressure to be the first to break a story, or
may simply not care about the consequences of transmitting sensitive
information. 32
General Schwarzkopf described an account from the 1991 Gulf War
where sensitive information was inadvertently disclosed by the media.
According to the Allied commander, during the ground operation, the
U.S. Seventh Army Corps started from the west of Kuwait, went north
into Iraq, and then curved around to the east behind the Iraqi forces.
This surprise maneuver was called a “left hook” and was meant to catch
the Iraqis unprepared as they were dug in to repel a frontal assault.
However, live information presented by the media almost foiled the
surprise. According to Schwarzkopf, “if they [the Iraqis] had any kind
of halfway decent intelligence,” the surprise element of the operation
would have been in peril. 33 Losing the surprise, in the opinion of
Schwarzkopf, would certainly have cost Allied lives. In another incident,
journalists reporting live from Israel and Saudi Arabia mentioned
precisely where Iraqi Scud missiles were landing. If the Scud missiles
and their operators had heard this information, they could have
readjusted their equipment, and hit their targets more precisely. 34
Fortunately for the Allies, the Iraqis lacked “halfway decent intelligence”
and the Scud missiles were notoriously inaccurate. The point, however,