Page 80 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo

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THE CNN EFFECT AND WAR
To many, the media are a dangerous element that intentionally exag-
gerate crises and seek drama for commercial benefit, unintentionally
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intensifying tensions and fanning the flames of hate.
Despite these differences, governments are increasingly attempting
to use transcontinental media networks to their political advantage
both domestically and externally. Democratic societies, since at least
the time of Woodrow Wilson, have come to expect and demand infor-
mation from their governments—especially during periods of crisis
and war. Some have pointed to the first of Wilson’s Fourteen Points
that called for “open covenants openly arrived at . . . in the public
view” as the great divide between “traditional diplomacy,” based on
autonomy and privacy and a “new diplomacy” based on accountability
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and openness.
If governments fail to provide positions on events,
they lose their opportunity to influence and allow speculation on their
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perspectives or opposing views to dominate. According to American
television veteran Ted Koppel, “For any administration, the absence
of clearly enunciated policy is the political equivalent to a vacuum. It
will be filled with whatever is available . . . The failure to engage in a
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clear, forthright, and timely fashion can cause irreparable damage.”
Externally, governments are increasingly viewing the media as a
powerful instrument in both their fight against adversaries and the
struggle to win the support of third-party governments not directly
involved in the dispute, but whose support is important in legitimiz-
ing a military campaign. In relation to adversaries, the 1991 Gulf War
demonstrated some novel ways in which the media could be used in
the domain of war. For example, on January 11, 1991, in the prelude
to the war, U.S. secretary of state James Baker was televised as he was
speaking to U.S. Air Force personnel and journalists in an air hangar
in Saudi Arabia, stating: “I can tell you this: You will not have to wait
much longer . . . Just so there is no misunderstanding, let me be
absolutely clear. We pass the brink at midnight January 15th.” 44
Parked behind Baker were an F-111 fighter-bomber and an EF-111A
Raven electronics-jamming warplane. The hangar, military hardware,
and bellowing military service personnel, all combined to make a
daunting image of confidence and preparedness. Baker’s target audi-
ence, of course, was not the air force personnel listening to his speech,
but rather Saddam Hussein, who he knew would be watching the
speech within the hour. As Baker later explained, “We didn’t send that
message through Joe Wilson [U.S. diplomat in Iraq]. We sent it
through CNN.” 45 The use of the media allowed the United States to
send a message to its adversary at speeds not possible even a few decades
before or through traditional diplomatic routes, adding a new type of