Page 32 - The Drucker Lectures
P. 32

The Myth of the State  [  13

                          And it is a real myth, according even to the dictionary defini-
                       tion I gave you at the beginning: “a tale, a fabrication, invoking
                       the supernatural to explain a natural phenomenon.” We may not
                       consciously personify the state as supernatural, though the process
                       that gave us the person of Uncle Sam and the symbolism of the flag
                       is probably not so very different from that that gave our ancestors
                       the corn goddess or the sacred oak of Dodona. But even without
                       the externals of personification, we see the state as a supernatural
                       being. We endow it with immortality and, though we cannot see
                       it, we give it reality and effectiveness, which means that we give
                       it the invisible body of the supernatural. All this, however, does
                       not mean, as the rationalists thought, that we deal with a mere
                       superstition, which dissolves before the light of logic and reason.
                       It means, on the contrary, that we are up against a reality and that
                       the myth alone makes it possible for us to deal with it rationally.
                          It makes no sense, then, to question whether there is a state
                       or whether there should be one. The very fact that we have the
                       myth of the state shows that the only question that is meaning-
                       ful is: What myth should we have, and how should we interpret
                       it, to have a true myth and a true state?
                          Often the answers have been given in an indirect form—that
                       is, by changing the title of the myth, by putting a different term
                       for state: tribe, polis, society, law, nation, race, etc. Of course,
                       each new title starts out with a different meaning and is brought
                       in with a definite propagandistic purpose. But very soon the
                       same old questions come up in connection with the new title,
                       which, to answer once and for all, the new title had been devised
                       for. Hence we have always been forced to do the job the hard
                       way: by working out the answers ourselves.
                          This job of working out the answers has been the central,
                       perhaps the only problem of political philosophy over the ages.
                       Therefore, I can hardly be expected to give you the solution in
                       the few minutes left to me tonight.
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