Page 161 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy
P. 161

134   THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN POST-WAR ECONOMY

             On the basis of – justifiable – uncertainty in regard to public reception
           of the consequences of the currency reform which made clear the
           dichotomy between  market economy and  planned economy, Erhard
           commissioned the IfD to assess public opinion in two surveys in June and
           July 1948. These showed that 71 per  cent and 74 per cent respectively
           welcomed the currency reform. Furthermore, 44 per cent of the
           interviewees considered the future of Germany after the reform more
           optimistic, while 22 per cent were undecided and 24 per cent remained
           sceptical and pessimistic.  However, these opinion polls also revealed that
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           the majority (79  per cent) considered the currency reform unfair and
           inconsiderate because it was seen to privilege certain sectors of society; for
           example, 62 per cent felt that mainly businesses benefited.  These results
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           were widely confirmed by an OMGUS survey in July 1948 in which the
           currency reform received hearty approval in  the American zone  of
           occupation. Nine in ten termed the reform drastic but necessary to jolt the
           economy back to life, and over half (53 per cent) thought it should have
           taken place earlier. It tended to create an optimistic  mood:  54 per cent
           expected the new currency to retain its value, 58 per cent believed that
           they would get along better during the coming year because of the reform.
           Even  so, dissatisfaction increasingly  pervaded society, particularly small
           savers who felt disadvantaged compared to proprietors.  Although
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           worries over the availability of basic necessities tended to decrease after
           the currency reform to nearly manageable proportions, anxiety over the
           means of obtaining them skyrocketed. By midsummer, for instance, half
           of the population in the American zone (48 per cent) said that they had no
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           means of livelihood, and by August this figure had risen to 59 per cent.
           Furthermore, while in June 78 per cent of the people in West Germany
           did not fear unemployment against 14 per cent who did,  by August of
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           that year, 77  per cent expected – correctly, as it  turned out – that the
           currency reform would lead to greater unemployment.  In fact, the
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           unemployment rate increased from 3.2 per cent in June to 12.2 per cent in
           December 1948.  Whereas many enjoyed the benefits of the currency
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           reform, more and more Germans did not and became mere onlookers of
           economic life.  Many felt betrayed by the  Economic Council and their
           representatives.  This bitterness was,  for instance,  documented  in a
           monthly report of the district president of Upper and Middle Franconia
           sent to the Bavarian government on 9 July 1948.  After living expenses
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           further increased by up to 200 per cent and simultaneously a general pay
           freeze had been imposed, confrontations between employees and
           employers grew and lawsuits in labour courts proliferated. For instance in
           Bavaria, the number of  pending lawsuits increased from 4,000 to 7,500
           between December 1948 and December 1949.  Public discord also
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