Page 163 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy

136 THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN POST-WAR ECONOMY

voting behaviour after the currency reform; only 4 per cent stated that
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they would vote differently in the next elections. And indeed, the
respective election results – and also the voter participation – differed only
marginally from the previous ones or even remained exactly the same as in
North Rhine-Westphalia. Solely in Rhineland-Palatinate was there a shift
in the relative strength in favour of the SPD whereas the CDU won even
more votes in other states, such as Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein or
Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern. Whereas votes in local elections generally
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offer limited evidence of the popularity of regional or federal policies, it is
safe to infer that the Union benefited from the SPD’s inability to take
advantage of the situation and to provide both a viable alternative to the
CDU’s socially acceptable market economy and a leading personality able
to confront the charismatic Ludwig Erhard.
Nonetheless, in late autumn 1948, Erhard’s popularity was under
considerable strain at both elite and mass level among the public.
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Thereupon, the Administration for Economics responded to former pleas
on the part of officials and the public for frequent information about the
administration’s activities though mainly by urging the media to be more
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supportive and the people to show more respect for the Frankfurt
achievements. Nevertheless, periodical price comparison lists were
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issued in order to inform consumers. In addition, the Gesetz gegen
Preistreiberei which enabled the prosecution of the forcing up of prices was
passed by the Economic Council on 7 October and the so-called
‘Jedermann-Programm’ which provided reasonably priced and specifically
marked goods to the people was started in November 1948. While the
majority of the Germans welcomed these actions (the Jedermann-Programm
in particular was embraced by 71 per cent of the respondents), all these
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measures had mixed success because they were limited in range and
merely aimed at appeasing the public.
In fact, an increasing number of people threatened by destitution and
unemployment showed their resentment. Spontaneous strikes and frantic
demonstrations took place. Alarmed and worried by this anarchy, the
Federation of German Trade Unions led by the labour union official Hans
Böckler requested a ‘sensible government control of the economy’ and
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eventually called for a general strike to be held on Friday 12 November
1948. While 9.2 million out of 11.7 million workers and employees in the
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Bizone followed the appeal in protest against the rising prices, and for
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economic democracy and socialisation, many of the strikers perceived
the work stoppage, deliberately called by Böckler for a Friday in order to
avoid further non-productive time, as a half-hearted holiday or warning
strike that would be ineffective at daunting Ludwig Erhard. Nonetheless,
the general strike and the SPD’s second – unsuccessful though – motion