Page 107 - The Resilient Organization
P. 107

94                   Part Three: Step 2. Building Resilience into the Organization


               decision-making routines, is the issue framed? Invite framing contests
               and strategy debates.
            4. Add thinking redundancy/equifinality/ambiguity (multiple meanings)
               through one of the following methods:
               •  Playing devil’s advocate (Someone acts as a challenger to consen-
                  sus decisions.)
               •  A shadow executive team (a group of junior organizational mem-
                  bers who express their views on strategic decisions for discussion
                  with the “real” executive team)
               •  Developing a network of independent people to entertain con-
                  trasting and differing views about future scenarios
               •  Maintaining “hypocrisy”: Keep talk and action separate to allow
                  the organization to cope with inconsistent societal demands that
                  cannot be reconciled [Brunsson, 1996 (in Warglien & Masuch,
                  1996)].
               •  Use humor, or even a “corporate jester,” to make points that oth-
                  erwise would be rejected (see the Chapter 8 sidebar, “A Note on
                  Jesters and the Role of Humor”). Jesters are, by their function and
                  through their antics, able to make occasionally true and helpful
                  (maybe annoying) points that others would get fired for.
            5. Explore the issue in terms of extremes (grotesque, for example):
               What is the very best or worst possible case? What is still possible
               (even if unthinkable in its consequences)?
            6. Consider the expected outcomes of important decisions, and write
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               the outcomes down at the time of the decision making. Compare the
               events that unfolded to the expected course of events. What does the
               difference suggest about the decision assumptions?


             Schwartz and Randall [2007: 97–98 (in Fukuyama, 2007)], in their dis-
          cussion on anticipating strategic surprises, recommend being “both imagina-
          tive and systematic.” Beyond raw labor, it is important to have the knack to
          put together different bits of information in a way that builds various sce-
          narios and event paths. Thus, one must be able to consider serendipity as
          part of one’s calculation in such a way that it enhances the interpretation of
          what can be (made) possible. This is being “serendipitously sagacious.” One
          may be able to be lucky and wise and identify an opportunity as per chance.
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