Page 264 - Toyota Under Fire

LESSONS

to Toyota’s safety culture were needed, the more important ques-
tion to ask is, what efforts are needed to improve the U.S. safety
culture?
Take, for example, the forces that shape communications
about product (not just automotive) recalls. When communicat-
ing a recall, a manufacturer has to balance many concerns, few
of which have anything to do with actual safety. First, the recall
has to be communicated in terms that are serious enough to in-
duce customers to act. If too few bring products in for repair or
replacement, the manufacturer is subject to fines. Meanwhile, the
manufacturer has to communicate in such a way as to protect it-
self from the worst charges that will inevitably be levied by law-
yers suing the company. The result is communications that are
often very difficult to understand, mired in legalese, and tragi-
cally uninformative to the people who matter most: the owners
of the products.
Many of the automobile safety scares that have received
heavy media coverage in the last 25 years—Audi surges, Suzuki
rollovers, Firestone tires, exploding Crown Victorias—either
were patently false or seem to have been overblown when you ex-
amine all the facts.* What does that say about the United States’
safety culture?
Our safety culture continues to focus on headlines and
bogeymen while ignoring major sources of risk. Our safety cul-
ture pushes companies to cover themselves against lawsuits, re-
sulting in warnings to avoid ironing clothes while wearing them,
but doesn’t address human errors as a major cause of accidents.

* Ed Wallace, “The Real Scandal behind the Toyota Recall,” Bloomberg Busi-
nessweek, February 11, 2010; http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content
/feb2010/bw20100211_986136.htm.

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