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                   240               THE ISA HANDBOOK IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY


                   The military forces of the intervening nations  As noted above, the standard assumption in
                   play a major role in this legitimation process.  UN first-generation peacekeeping missions
                     In this conceptualization, in comparison to  had been that military personnel from the
                   first-generation peacekeeping, strategic  neutral middle powers would be the best
                   peacekeeping in Dobbie’s formulation may  peacekeepers. Moskos’s (1976) research on
                   have the consent of the conflicting parties,  the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFI-
                   although the level of consent may be lower  CYP), which included a military contingent
                   than that found in first-generation operations,  from the United Kingdom, challenged this
                   and in Dandeker and Gow’s formulation,  assumption. Moskos showed that military
                   may abandon the first-generation norm of  professionalism contributed strongly to the
                   consent in favor of broader legitimacy.  ability of soldiers to adapt to the norms of
                   The political objective that characterizes   peacekeeping. The finding was subsequently
                   first-generation missions, such as a treaty, is  replicated with  American combat troops
                   absent, although agreement on a solution to  (Segal and Meeker, 1985).
                   the conflict rests with the conflicting parties.  Nonetheless, the superpowers were gener-
                   The mission is likely to be more coercive  ally excluded and other major powers were
                   than first-generation operations, with the  minimally represented in first-generation
                   strategic initiative being taken by the inter-  missions. In the early 1980s, when a pro-
                   vening nations, rather than the parties to that  posed UN force in support of the Camp
                   conflict even though the whole point is for  David  Accords between Egypt and Israel,
                   the parties themselves to settle their dispute  which was to have no major power military
                   under the strategic ‘prodding’of the interven-  presence, failed to gain UN sponsorship, an
                   ing military and political forces. The need for  alternative proposal was put forward to use
                   the use of force is likely to be greater. These  American troops to guarantee the peace in
                   missions will be complex, with a number of  lieu of the moral suasion of the UN.  That
                   actors, and the pressures on the force com-  presence, while accepted, was a matter of
                   mander – both military and political – are  some concern (Segal and Segal, 1993: 56).
                   likely to be great.                     In the long run, the successful participation
                     If the robustness of the mission progresses   of the United States, Great Britain, and
                   to peace enforcement, not only does the initia-  France in that mission contributed to a
                   tive reside with the intervening parties, but so  change in norms.
                   too does the definition of the solution to the con-  In the post-Cold War period, peacekeeping
                   flict. Thus, in peace enforcement, not only is the  participation became an option for US policy,
                   norm of consent not necessarily operational but  and Russia became a cooperative Security
                   neither is the first-generation norm of impartial-  Council member with regard to the authoriza-
                   ity, particularly as it has been equated to neutral-  tion of peacekeeping operations (Kurashina
                   ity in first-generation missions (Donald, 2003).  and Segal, 2007). International expectations
                   As Donald (2003: 435) notes, ‘it is impossible  regarding the peacekeeping role of the
                   to use force and be always perceived to be  UN expanded in the late 1980s, reaching a
                   impartial’.  The peace enforcers explicitly  peak with the Gulf  War, in which the
                   become parties to the conflict.         Security Council made a series of decisions
                                                           to carry out sanctions against Iraq after the
                                                           invasion of Kuwait.  The United States and
                                                           major European powers participated in mili-
                   CHANGES IN PEACEKEEPING                 tary operations in the Gulf, reflecting a
                   PARTICIPATION                           change in the nature of peace missions and in
                                                           a first wave of changes in the nature of the
                   One of the enduring questions in international  participants in these missions.  The major
                   peacekeeping has been who should do it.   nations also dismissed attempts by other
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