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of peacekeeping operations reviewed above and democracy in war-torn and unstable parts
are likely to be as a response. In this regard, of the world, and not just in the Middle East.
ongoing operations in Iraq as well as A case in point is the widely discussed book
Afghanistan will influence the United States by General Sir Rupert Smith (Smith, 2005),
and others in their perceptions of the ‘utility which encompasses not only Iraq but also
of force’ to use Rupert Smith’s phrase Bosnia in the 1990s, where he was force
(Smith, 2005). Iraq, in particular, provides a commander.
challenging case of an attempted military- Third, this outcome would be unfortunate,
induced process of regime change and democ- especially if it led to a lack of interest in par-
ratization, beginning with a short military ticipating in peace missions not least among
invasion and then a protracted and complex those countries whose expertise is particu-
period of – simultaneous–counter-insurgency larly valuable, especially in peace operations
and reconstruction, where the political risks of the more ‘strategic’ kind. Actually, what
of failure and the costs already accumulated these events should provoke is a continuing
are substantial. debate on how armed force, as one of the
Although one must be cautious in making instruments of a state’s policy tool box, can be
anything other than preliminary observations conjoined with other instruments – political,
about the implications of current operations diplomatic, economic, and cultural – to achieve
in Iraq, some points are clear. First, while success (not in the absolutist sense of military
there continues to be a debate about the legal- victory) in terms of the above goals. In this
ity, legitimacy, and prudence of the invasion regard, we know from the experience of the
of Iraq in pursuit of regime change, as well as varieties of peace operations discussed ear-
about the extent to which the post-conflict lier that, in the end, peace has to be built by
phase of reconstruction could have been the warring parties themselves, no matter
resourced and managed better than it was by how much ‘strategic pushing’ is provided by
the military and by the United States outsiders. To be sure, any such pushing has to
Department of Defense and State Department, be backed by a political will and an under-
the – some would say reckless – optimism of standing of what force can and cannot be
2003 has now faded away. This is likely to expected to achieve; this is an especially
lead the United States (and perhaps its allies important point for those contemplating
such as the United Kingdom) to adopt a much engaging in a war-torn country where the
more cautious approach to complex and long- prospects for an early peace and withdrawal
lasting military engagements of this kind in of intervening forces are remote (note that
the future. Even accepting the strategic need such forces still remain in Bosnia and
to prosecute a ‘Long War’ against terror, this Kosovo for example) or seeking to democra-
is likely to lead to a preference for using the tize a state through a policy of military-led
military in ‘strategic raiding’ – based on a regime change. Again, we know from earlier
swift application of force to clearly identified experiences of peace operations that these
and restricted targets and then a withdrawal – are multinational enterprises for reasons of
where and when it feels this is imperative. (On both financial cost and international political
the idea, of raiding, see Prins, 2002.) legitimacy. Yet different countries are likely
A second point is that the current difficul- to have varying degrees of political will,
ties and perceived lack of genuine progress in and this often extends to their political agen-
the operations against counter-insurgency in das, attitudes toward risk, including casual-
parts of Iraq are likely to lead to a wider and ties, and thus to policies on force protection
more profound realism, if not pessimism, in and rules of engagement. Some contributors,
political and military circles as well as among to be frank, are likely to be a burden as
wider publics about the utility of force in much as an asset for a force commander,
achieving the goals of nation building, peace, although the political context normally prevents