Page 221 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition

COMMUNICATING POLITICS

highlight evidence of German atrocities against Jews and other
groups in the countries they controlled for the populations of the
Allied countries to recognise the menacing nature of Nazism. In this
case, national survival was perceived to be at stake.
Wars of national survival are rare, however. Indeed, it may be
argued that the Second World War was the only such conflict of
the twentieth century for the advanced capitalist world. War against
the Soviet Union, had it ever been allowed to break out, would
have been another. But most conflicts are fought over issues of
territoriality, strategic resources or economic self-interest. In such
wars defeat may involve national humiliation and the downfall of a
government, but not the collapse of the society. Citizens, therefore,
are less likely to support them, and may actively campaign against
them, as occurred in both the Vietnam and the Falklands conflicts.
Mercer et al. note that ‘in a limited war, the relationship between
politicians and the media will be particularly sensitive; the govern-
ment’s interest will not necessarily be construed as identical to
the national interest. [In] a time of tension preceding a war, the
potential power of the media to sway public opinion is even greater’
(1987, p. 6). In these situations governments have to ‘manufacture’
consent for the pursuit of war, and manage opinion in such a way
that the war aims are achieved.
Opinion also matters on the international level. To embark on a
major military campaign like Operation Desert Storm, or the attack
on Afghanistan after September 11, the US and its allies required
not only the support of their own people, but that of the United
Nations in its capacity as the collective voice of the world commu-
nity. Wars have been fought by big powers in the absence of inter-
national endorsement, but the current political environment is such
that no country, no matter how powerful politically, can pursue
major military objectives in isolation. Early in 1998, when it
appeared that the Saddam regime was refusing to comply with
United Nations’ resolutions on weapons of mass destruction, a
huge public relations effort was organised by the US and British
governments to prepare domestic opinion in both countries for
another military campaign against the Iraqi dictator. Like the first
Gulf War (see below) this was a necessary prerequisite for military
action.
When yet another assault on Saddam Hussein was being
prepared in the autumn of 2002, much of the political debate in the
West concerned whether or not, in the altered context of the post-
September 11 environment, it was necessary to secure international

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