Page 234 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

in ways never contemplated by human rights groups. It called
for a frontal assault on public opinion such as had not been seen
since the Spanish–American war. The war had to be sold’ (ibid.,
p. 42).
Pursuing these objectives in the Gulf was never going to be as
easy as had been the case in the Falklands, Grenada or Panama.
The geographical location of the conflict, and its international
dimension, inevitably increased its media accessibility and news-
worthiness. Media organisations, particularly the television crews
of CNN, the BBC and others, had access to more sophisticated
communications technology, such as portable satellite transmission
equipment, than had been the case even a few years before.
Furthermore, many Western journalists located themselves in Iraq,
beyond the reach of allied military censors, before hostilities proper
began.
Despite these environmental factors, the allies could still have
prevented journalists reporting the conflict, had they been inclined
to do so. As Macarthur points out, however, the war had to be
‘sold’ as well as fought and won. Indeed, as noted earlier the two
procedures were, by the end of the twentieth century, closely
related. It was not therefore in the interests of the anti-Hussein
coalition to block all coverage, and so to antagonise international
public opinion by denying it information. Better by far to ensure
that the information about, and images of, the conflict which made
it into the public domain were compatible, as far as possible, with
the allies’ military and political objectives. This resulted in the Gulf
War and its build-up being conducted against the backdrop of
a sophisticated information management and public relations
campaign.
From the onset of the crisis journalistic access to the crucial
areas was restricted, with the US and its allies co-operating in the
establishment of a ‘pool’ system. As the New York Times put it, ‘the
Gulf war marked this century’s first major conflict where the policy
was to confine reporters to escorted pools that sharply curtailed
when and how they could talk to the troops’ (quoted in Macarthur,
1992, p. 7). One hundred and fifty US military ‘public affairs’
officers were assigned to shepherd the journalists of the ‘National
Media Pool’ around the desired locations, and to keep them away
from sensitive areas. The British army deployed its apparatus of
public relations officers to perform the same function.
At the front, journalists were formed into ‘Media Reporting
Teams’, closely watched over by the military PROs who

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