Page 235 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition
P. 235

COMMUNICATING POLITICS

                accompanied the troops during their training and, when the time
                came, into battle. With the exception of a few ‘unilaterals’ (Taylor,
                1992) such as Robert Fisk of the Independent, who broke away
                from  the  pool  system  and  attempted,  with  varying  degrees  of
                success,  to  gain  unsupervised  access  to  stories,  the  vast  majority
                of journalists present at the scene were subject to the ‘protection’ of
                the military.
                  While the journalists were thus constrained from moving freely
                around the war zone and reporting what they saw there, the Allies
                fed the media with a diet of information which, on the one hand,
                sanitised the conflict for domestic consumption and on the other
                contributed to the ongoing psychological battle against Saddam and
                the Iraqis.
                  In  Dhahran,  where  the  allies  were  preparing  their  military
                offensive,  a  Joint  Information  Bureau  was  established  to  supply
                journalists  with  material.  When  hostilities  began,  this  amounted
                largely to video film of aircraft undertaking aerial strikes against
                Iraqi  targets.  The  material  appeared  to  demonstrate  the  success
                of  the  Allies’  military  tactics,  while  avoiding  coverage  of  Iraqi
                casualties. As many observers have noted, the media war had the
                appearance of a computer game. Visuals were often accompanied
                by exaggerated claims of success in bombing raids, taking out Iraqi
                missiles and so on.
                  The Gulf War was, of course, a spectacularly successful military
                operation from the Allies’ point of view, presenting an awesome
                demonstration  of  the  destructive  power  of  modern  technology
                and  resulting  in  very  few  allied  casualties.  The  conflict,  unlike
                that  in  Vietnam,  was  quick  and  clean,  by  the  standards  of  the
                military, serving to justify the restricted information policy which
                accompanied  it.  As  John  Macarthur  and  other  observers  have
                pointed out, however, if we as citizens are to ‘take seriously the
                concept of informed consent in a democracy’ (1992, p. 150) do we
                not have the right to expect a fuller, more complete picture of an
                event of such importance as the Gulf conflict?
                  Those  who  argue  that  we  do  have  such  a  right  criticised  the
                Western media – and those of Britain and the US in particular – for
                so  meekly  embracing  the  pool  system,  the  sanitised  information
                and disinformation coming out of Dhahran and Riyadh, and the
                frequent censorship of journalistic material which occurred, as in
                the Falklands, for reasons of ‘taste and tone’ rather than military
                security. The media, it is argued, should have applied its Fourth
                Estate, watchdog role to the event with more vigour, giving citizens


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