Page 227 - Communication and the Evolution of Society
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204                        Communication  and  Evolution  of  Society

         are  not  arbitrary;  they  are  shaped  by  our  human  condition  and
         conduct,  by  our  forms  of  life.”  °?  That  may  well  be.  But  who
         guarantees  that  the  grammar  of  these  forms  of  life  not  only
         regulates  customs  but  gives  expression  to  reason.  It  is  only  a  small
         step  from  this  conservative  appropriation  of  the  great  traditions
         in  terms  of  language  games  to  the  traditionalism  of  a  Michael
         Oakeshott.*?  This  is  also  the  position  that  Hennis  adopts  when,
         while  presupposing  virtue  and  justice  as  the  validity  basis  of
         legitimate  domination,  he  nevertheless  has  recourse  only  to  cus-
         toms.
           I  have  discussed  two  concepts  of  legitimation,  the  empiricist
         and  the  normativist.  One  can  be  employed  in  the  social  sciences
         but  is  unsatisfactory  because  it  abstracts  from  the  systematic
         weight  of  grounds  for  validity;  the  other  would  be  satisfactory
         in  this  regard  but  is  untenable  because  of  the  metaphysical  con-
         text  in  which  it  is  embedded.  I  would  like,  therefore,  to  propose
         a  third  concept  of  legitimation,  which  I  shall  call  the  ‘“‘recon-
         structive.”
            I  shall  begin  by  assuming  that  the  proposition:  “Recommenda-
         tion  X  is  legitimate’  has  the  same  meaning  as  the  proposition:
         ‘Recommendation  X  is  in  the  general  (or  public)  interest,”
         where  X  can  be  an  action  as  well  as  a  norm  of  action  or  even  a
         system  of  such  norms  (in  the  case  we  are  considering,  a  system
         of  domination).  ‘“X  is  in  the  general  interest’’  is  to  mean  that
         the  normative  validity  claim  connected  with  X  counts  as  justi-
         fied.**  The  justifiability  of  competing  validity  claims  is  decided
         by  a  system  of  possible  justifications;  a  single  justification  is  called
         a  legitimation.  The  reconstruction  of  given  legitimations  can  con-
         sist,  first,  in  discovering  the  justificatory  system,  S,  that  allows
         for  evaluating  the  given  legitimations  as  valid  or  invalid  in  S.
         “Walid  in  S”’  is  to  mean  only  that  anyone  who  accepts  S—a  myth
         or  a  cosmology  or  a  political  theory—must  also  accept  the  grounds
         given  in  valid  legitimations.  This  necessity  expresses  a  consistency
         connection  resulting  from  the  internal  relations  of  the  justificatory
         system.
            In  taking  a  justification  up  to  this  threshold,  we  have  inter-
         preted  a  belief  in  legitimacy  and  tested  its  consistency.  Along  this
         hermeneutic  path  alone,  however,  we  do  not  arrive  at  a  judgment
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