Page 32 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite
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20            Communication,  Commerce and Power

           Because RCA owns NBC, and because RCA owns shares in the state-
           established Communications  Satellite Corporation (Comsat),  and so
           forth,  a  self-perpetuating  systemic  monolith  of public  and  private
           sector interests are assumed to be working in imperialistic harmony. 9
             The history of DBS and related developments, however, reveals not
           just a more complex  relationship  among these  interests,  it  also  sug-
           gests that different policy outcomes should sometimes be anticipated.
           While, in the 1960s, RCA (which held significant satellite manufactur-
           ing  interests)  had  received ·some  money  from  the  Department  of
           Defense to perform preliminary DBS research, NBC, as its terrestrial
           broadcaster, had no interest in the domestic competition represented
           by  direct  broadcast  applications.  And  while  Comsat  officials  were
           similarly  uninterested  in  DBS-type  advancements  - largely  due  to
           the  potential  of  direct  broadcasting  to  harm  aspects  of  AT &T's
           (Comsat's  major  shareholder)  established  telecommunication  infra-
           structure - American military  officials indeed were  interested in  the
           development  of  any  far-reaching  and  relatively  cost-effective
           communications technology.  With few  exceptions, critical analysts of
           US foreign communication policy have glossed over such schisms and
           their complex implications,  and instead have  tended to assume  that,
           because  new  space  satellite  technologies  will  improve  the  general
           international power capacities  of the  US  government  and US-based
           corporations, they will be developed and implemented.  10
             The main point to be made from this trivialization of conflict is that
           the cultural imperialism paradigm, if it is to be developed into a means
           of accurately assessing US policies and capacities, requires the analyst
           to  recognize  the  usually problematic nature of the intra-state,  inter-
           and  intra-corporate,  and  intra-structural  relationships  that  directly
           influence nation-state activities  and international developments.  The
           history of DBS  and more general US  foreign  communication policy
           developments  reveal  cultural imperialism to  be  an  essentially  reduc-
           tionist,  non-dialectical  approach  to  a  complex  and  extraordinarily
           important scholarly project.
             Complex  systemic  and incidental factors  have directly  shaped  the
           history of US foreign communication policy and DBS- systemic and
           incidental  factors  that  serve  to clarify  and  correct  these  generaliza-
           tions.  US  foreign  communication  policy  has  been  remarkably  un-
           coordinated and at times riddled with paradoxes and contradictions.
           Rather than a policy field characterized by an ongoing drive to build
           overseas  markets,  US  telesatellite  policy  has  been  dominated  (until
           recently)  by  vested  interests  associated  with  AT &T's  domestic
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