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Telesatellite Policy and DBS,  1962-1984     71

               Affairs, in Hearings on 'Satellite Broadcasting: Implications for Foreign
               Policy,' pp. 64-5.
           63   In  1966,  AT&T charged  ABC  $12  million  annually  for its  microwave
               distribution services. ABC estimated that a telesatellite system designed
               for its particular needs could save $5 million over a five-year period. See
               Smith, Communication via Satellite, p.  158. According to Heather Hud-
               son,  because of these minimal  savings,  'ABC may have been  using  its
               satellite option merely to put pressure on AT&T, by threatening defec-
               tion if AT&T increased its rates' - Hudson,  Communication  Satellites,
               p. 40.
           64   In  1974,  as  a  result  of what  was  commonly  called  the  'Open  Skies'
               policy,  Western  Union launched  the  first  competitive domestic  telesa-
               tellite.  By  1984,  seven  US  companies  operated  domestic  telesatellite
               systems.
           65   Building on the earlier ABC application, in 1969 CBS television officials
               proposed  the  formation  of a  domestic  telesatellite  system  owned  and
                operated by all three television networks.
           66   President's  Task  Force  on  Communications  Policy,  Final  Report,
                (Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Office,  7 December 1968);
                herein referred to as 'Rostow Report'.
           67   For example, in 1972 (the year of the Watergate break-in and Presiden-
                tial election) Nixon directed John Mitchell to file antitrust suits against
                the three television networks through the DoJ. These had been prepared
                in  1970 and were apparently applied two years later only as a result of
                the  broadcasters'  'negative/anti-Nixon'  news  reports.  Two  months
                before election day, the head of the OTP, Clay Whitehead, delivered a
                speech  in  San  Francisco  that  was  commonly  interpreted  as  another
                threat.  Whitehead claimed  that an OTP study supported the demands
                of the American Screen Actors' Guild that ABC, NBC and CBS should
                be compelled by the FCC to spend more money on original productions
                rather  than  airing  reruns.  The  message  to  the  networks  was  clear:
                modify  negative  coverage  of White  House  activities  or  face  higher
                costs  and  legal  skirmishes.  Tunstall,  Communications  Deregulation,
                p. 208.
           68   Lyndon  B.  Johnson,  'Message from  the  President  of the  US:  Recom-
                mendations  Relative  to  World  Communications'  (14  August  1967),
                reprinted in Rostow Report, Appendix A,  p.  3.
           69   Kinsley,  Outer Space and Inner Sanctums,  p.  150.
           70   Rostow Report, chap.  7, p.  32.
           71   Ibid., p. 33. Lloyd Musolf estimated in 1968 that a domestic DBS system
                with  roughly  similar  capacities  would  cost  half as  much  as  the  GSO-
                terrestrial hybrid system proposed by Comsat in 1966. See  Musolf (ed.),
                Communications Satellites in  Political Orbit,  p.  148.
           72   Rostow Report, chap.  7, p.  33.
           73   For examples, see Barry Cole and Mal Oettinger, Reluctant Regulators,
                The FCC and the Broadcast Audience (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
                1978), chap.  10.
           74   Rostow Report, chap. 7,  pp.  36--9.
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