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66           Communication,  Commerce and Power

           of private  and,  subsequently,  public  sector agents  in  the  making  of
           communication  policy.  These  interests,  how  they  were  expressed
           through government offices, and how these pressures and mediations
           in  tum  reshaped  state  foreign  policy  structures  and  outcomes  are
           questions  that  will  be  pursued  in  the  next  chapter.  By  examining
           these  developments,  Chapter  4  begins  the  task  of specifying  how
           American state structures affected and were affected by private sector
           and intra-state forces.



           NOTES
               Delbert  D.  Smith,  Communication  via  Satellite:  A  Vision  in  Retrospect
               (Leyden: A.W.  Sijthoff,  1976) p.  255.
           2   For instance, in  1972 FCC commissioner Robert E.  Lee argued in favor
               of this  development in  a  series of public speeches.  See  'Lee Cites Need
               Now  to  Start  Shaping  Ground  Rules  for  Direct  Satellites',  in  Broad-
               casting (27 August 1973) 38.
           3   Following  the  Second  World  War,  the  US  military  initiated  classified
               feasibility studies on the potential applications of  earth-orbiting satellites.
               But largely due to the absence of clear research objectives,  coordinated
               inter-agency planning and an overriding interest in ballistic missile devel-
               opments,  the  only  significant  advancement  made  by  the  mid-1950s
               involved  launch  vehicles.  As  for  the  social  implications  of telesatellite
               technologies,  the Rand Corporation in  1949 organized the first national
               conference on the subject. One conference conclusion was the assumption
               that 'the paramount utility of a satellite probably resides in its potential-
               ities  as  an  instrument  for  the  achievement  of  political!psychological
               goals,' Delbert D. Smith,  Communication via Satellite, pp.  18-19 and 29.
           4   See  excerpts  from  US  Senate,  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space
               Sciences, Staff Report, 'The Background of United States Involvement,'
               in  Lloyd  D.  Musolf (ed.),  Communications  Satellites  in  Political  Orbit
               (San  Francisco: Chandler, 1968) p.  13.
           5   Sputnik's technological superiority was made most apparent by the fact
               that its mass was nine times greater than the proposed American satellite
               and its orbit reached twice the altitude of the NAS/DoD plan.
           6   NASA was to become the largest and most active civilian space science
               research  agency  in  the  world,  although  all  its  research  related  to  US
               defense  would  be  the  responsibility  of  the  DoD.  Other  American
               responses  to Sputnik are summarized in  Heather Hudson,  Communica-
               tion  Satellites:  Their  Development  and Impact  (New  York:  Free  Press,
               1990) pp.  14-15.
           7   'National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.' Public Law 85-568, 85th
               Cong.,  72  Stat. 426,  29  July  1958.  See discussion in Smith,  Communica-
               tion via  Satellite, pp. 41-60.
           8   Ibid.,  p.  63.
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