Page 75 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

Telesatellite Policy and DBS, 1962-1984 63

was forced to shut down. Given the limited power generated by Anik
C-2 (and thus a minimum 4-foot reception dish required to receive its
signals); the provision of only three of its five promised channels; and
its ability to acquire only 9,000 subscribers, the USCI venture lost
approximately $53 million. 102 By October 1984, only four prospective
DBS services remained registered with the FCC. The three applicants
that had appeared most capable of mounting a successful DBS service
(apart from STC)- RCA, Western Union and CBS- by this time had
all withdrawn. By the end of 1984, citing the competitive strength of
the cable television industry and the high cost of acquiring popular
programing, STC officials also canceled their plans. As Jeremy Tun-
stall summarizes, 'the 1983-84 disaster for DBS was on such a scale as
to somewhat depress the entire business of space satellites.' 103

3.5 CONCLUSIONS

The early development or underdevelopment of DBS technologies was
dominated by powerful domestic and international, private and public
sector, terrestrial telecommunications interests. Rather than an aware-
ness and application of some form of cultural power influencing US
policy, the more than two decades reviewed in this chapter reveal a
history reflecting not only the early marginal status of DBS but even
the presence of some disdain toward commercial mass media exports
in general. In 1962, some of the Democratic Senators opposing the
Communications Satellite Act argued that rather than fearing the
Soviet propaganda potentials represented by telesatellites, the
exploitation of the international airwaves by corporate interests
should be of at least equal concern. 104 Even the notion of telesatellites
being used to serve the propaganda interests of American state agen-
cies was consistently rejected, despite a general recognition of the
potential technological and economic advantages of a DBS system.
Apparently, the only force that would have compelled US officials to
pursue the public or private sector development and application of
direct broadcast technologies aggressively would have been the use of
DBS by the Soviet Union. As noted in 1967 by the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists:

We can expect that within a few years the Russians will begin
stationing communications satellites ... , permitting the beaming
of television pictures to South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.