Page 71 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

Telesatellite Policy and DBS, 1962-1984 59

monopoly by means of a state sanctioned arrangement was over.
Beginning in the early 1970s, fortified by their dominant market
position, AT&T officials themselves became leading advocates of an
Open Skies approach to the regulation of domestic telesatellites. 83
In establishing the Rostow task force, President Johnson stated that
'The communications satellite knows no geographic boundary
... [and] owes allegiance to no single language or political philosophy.
Man now has it within his power to speak directly to his fellow man in
all nations.' 84 But despite this rhetoric, policy initiatives that would
enable the development and application of DBS or quasi-DBS tech-
nologies, or policies designed to stimulate US private sector ventures
in telesatellite broadcasting, remained altogether absent in Rostow's
final report. Established common carriers and domestic broadcasting
interests instead managed to curb the development of competitive
telesatellite services until the Open Skies policy emerged in the early
1970s. As both communication and computer-based technologies
developed, TNC activities became increasingly dependent on telecom-
munications. As such, the Open Skies policy itself became an issue of
growing concern for a broad range of private sector interests not
directly involved in the telecommunications business. Public sector
officials were pressured to promote a more competitive marketplace
among communication and information service providers based
largely on the assumed cost savings and innovations that would
result. Moreover, as TNCs became increasingly dependent on tele-
communications and electronic data flows in their day-to-day inter-
national operations, US government officials were encouraged to
export this relatively competitive market regulatory approach. While
the forces underlying these developments and their implications are
directly addressed in later chapters, again it is important to make the
general point that the Open Skies policy was formulated with little or
no recognition that new communication technologies could be applied
to service some kind of international cultural-power strategy. Instead,
TNCs such as IBM and General Motors became increasingly influen-
tial participants in the development of foreign communication policy
as both technological innovators and large-scale telecommunications
users. According to Jill Hills, once these and other large business
85
users became directly involved in policy developments concerning
equipment and services, 'the two fed off each other':

the liberalisation of equipment increasing the demand for the
liberalisation of transmission and the liberalisation of transmission