Page 68 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

56 Communication, Commerce and Power

the Johnson administration. 66 Chaired by the Department of State
Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Eugene V. Rostow, the com-
monly called Rostow Report was completed in December 1968.
Although Rostow's official assignment had been to recommend how
public sector satellite technology could best be applied by the Amer-
ican private sector, the scope of his final report addressed much
broader issues.
The most tangible outcome of the Rostow Report was the establish-
ment of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) in 1970. The
OTP was an executive branch office with headquarters in the White
House. Its mission was to address and represent the President on all
questions concerning US communication policy, both domestic and
international. Given this extraordinarily broad mandate, OTP offi-
cials participated directly in FCC proceedings and legislative lobbying
activities. By 1977, due in large part to a Carter administration
promise to cut White House staff and spending, the opposition of
commercial and public broadcasters to OTP support for the emerging
cable television industry, and past activities involving efforts by Pres-
ident Nixon to curb negative media coverage of his administration, 67
the office was moved out of the White House and into the Depart-
ment of Commerce and renamed the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA). The new NTIA's mandate
was modified from that of its predecessor by focusing it more toward
domestic telecommunications.
On domestic telesatellite policy, the Rostow task force concluded
that because it was unlikely that substantial cost savings could be
achieved in the short term by substituting telesatellite systems for
existing terrestrial facilities, the 'balanced' development of the existing
cable and microwave-based (AT&T dominated) system with comple-
mentary, multipurpose satellites constituted the best policy for the
United States 'with Comsat playing the leading role. ' 68 These and
other Rostow conclusions were not, however, the unadulterated prod-
ucts of a far-reaching and somehow objective deliberation. Instead, the
task force unilaterally extended its mandate in an effort to construct
some kind of sector-wide rapprochement in light of the ongoing domin-
ance of AT&T in domestic developments. 69 As for DBS, Rostow
reported that 'The high cost and disruptive effects of direct satellite-
to-home broadcasting make it unpromising, at least in the near term.' 70
Even in 1968, the assumptions made in this one sentence were
dubious. Although the task force reported that the overhead costs
of a DBS system would be 'inordinately expensive' in relation to