Page 63 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

Telesatellite Policy and DBS, 1962-1984 51

became much discussed but were rarely addressed in terms of their
cultural-power implications. By 1967, DBS instead was considered to
be a potentially useful medium through which to deliver mass
education programs largely designed by developing countries to
LDCs, or it was seen as a potentially threatening state propaganda
vehicle if developed and used by the Soviet Union. Less common but
nevertheless present was the view that DBS constituted a potentially
disruptive technology in terms of its impact on the stability and
predictability of domestic and foreign public opinion, possibly
undermining aspects of traditional behind-closed-doors diplomatic
practices and, more generally, complicating established foreign policy
activities.
Early telesatellite developments in general, and those involving
DBS in particular, were not influenced by American state
policies involving prospective cultural-power applications. In fact,
quite the opposite perspective was expressed by the USIA in 1967.
As one official testified to Congress, private sector control over tete-
satellites and their use as commercial media could provide 'little
control' by the US government 'over what we [Americans] send out.'
As a result, according to Wilson Dizard, 'we often send out the second
rate, the irrelevant things that don't count, in terms of ... problems
with ... developing countries, all countries.' Dizard regretfully con-
cluded that the emerging status of commercial interests in interna-
tional communications constitute part of the 'price we pay for
freedom. ' 45
The urgency of the US response to Soviet space achievements and
the dominance of status quo common carrier interests pushed forward
the creation of Comsat. Moreover, because of its majority control of
Intelsat, American carriers directly shaped the formative development
of international telesatellite systems. These circumstances placed these
interests in an extraordinarily powerful position ·which, as discussed
later in this chapter, enabled them to retard preliminary DBS devel-
opments. By the late 1960s, Comsat and Intelsat were generally
viewed by American officials to be little more than world-wide
extensions of the AT&T domestic monopoly and, as such, their regul-
ation involved a seemingly straightforward geographic extension of
FCC oversight responsibilities. However, as pursued in the next sec-
tion, while 'the US government ... easily outplayed the USSR on the
world telephone/communications stage, ... [it] had a much more diffi-
cult and indecisive struggle with its home telephone monopoly
AT&T.' 46