Page 66 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite
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54           Communication,  Commerce and Power

             In the late 1960s, some members of Congress argued that DBS one
           day would become 'the most widely used and influential ... medium of
           communication ... for  the  advancement  of mass  education,  and  the
           fostering  of economic  and  social  change  in  developing  countries.' 55
           For the first time, direct broadcasting was directly associated with the
           use of the American mass media as a means to influence the perspect-
           ives  of foreign  publics.  According  to  a  report  prepared in  1967  for
           Congress,  'modern communications ... [can  be used  to  advance]  our
           international objectives .... For example, we  have not yet  succeeded
           in  making our national experience  and achievements relevant  to the
           aspirations for a better life of some two-thirds of the human race. ' 56
             Similar  observations  were  made  two  years  later  in  Congressional
           hearings and in a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs subcom-
           mittee  report.  57   But  rather  than  representing  a  growing  awareness
           among  American  officials  of  the  cultural-power  implications  of
           DBS, the issue was  only raised in relation to the development of the
           ATS experimental DBS system and its forthcoming application by the
           government  of India.  Although  plans  for  this  had  begun  in  1967,
           these  educational  television  transmissions  were  not  initiated  until
           1974 when  5,000 communities located throughout India received sig-
           nals.58 By this time, however, the ATS experiment was more than just
           a response to the long-standing marginalization of DBS among pre-
           dominant US telecommunication interests. In 1974, the Indian experi-
           ment also constituted a response to the growing foreign resistance to
           US foreign p9licy efforts involving communications (see Chapter 4).
             By  the  end of the  1960s,  DBS,  despite  its  technological  and com-
           mercial underdevelopment, already had become 'the most viable point
           of contention'  for  LDCs  seeking  to ·organize  a  response  to  more
           general  development  issues. 59   Domestically,  DBS  remained  a  threat
           to  AT&T  and  the  NAB.  However,  the new Nixon  administration-
           attempting to counter more general foreign  opposition to the United
           States- sought to promote DBS as a tool for Third World develop-
           ment needs while simultaneously redressing the concerns of domestic
           DBS opponents by limiting its application.  Through NASA and its
                                                60
           legislated mandate to conduct and support research toward the gen-
           eral  advancement  of  knowledge  concerning  outer  space,  the  US
           executive quite possibly sought to deflect domestic anti-DBS lobbying
           while appeasing pro-DBS aerospace interests.
             By  the  end  of the  1960s,  the  economic  efficiencies  and  potential
           cultural-power  applications  provided  by  DBS  remained  altogether
           secondary  to  US  policy in  relation  to  predominant  communication
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