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54 Communication, Commerce and Power
In the late 1960s, some members of Congress argued that DBS one
day would become 'the most widely used and influential ... medium of
communication ... for the advancement of mass education, and the
fostering of economic and social change in developing countries.' 55
For the first time, direct broadcasting was directly associated with the
use of the American mass media as a means to influence the perspect-
ives of foreign publics. According to a report prepared in 1967 for
Congress, 'modern communications ... [can be used to advance] our
international objectives .... For example, we have not yet succeeded
in making our national experience and achievements relevant to the
aspirations for a better life of some two-thirds of the human race. ' 56
Similar observations were made two years later in Congressional
hearings and in a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs subcom-
mittee report. 57 But rather than representing a growing awareness
among American officials of the cultural-power implications of
DBS, the issue was only raised in relation to the development of the
ATS experimental DBS system and its forthcoming application by the
government of India. Although plans for this had begun in 1967,
these educational television transmissions were not initiated until
1974 when 5,000 communities located throughout India received sig-
nals.58 By this time, however, the ATS experiment was more than just
a response to the long-standing marginalization of DBS among pre-
dominant US telecommunication interests. In 1974, the Indian experi-
ment also constituted a response to the growing foreign resistance to
US foreign p9licy efforts involving communications (see Chapter 4).
By the end of the 1960s, DBS, despite its technological and com-
mercial underdevelopment, already had become 'the most viable point
of contention' for LDCs seeking to ·organize a response to more
general development issues. 59 Domestically, DBS remained a threat
to AT&T and the NAB. However, the new Nixon administration-
attempting to counter more general foreign opposition to the United
States- sought to promote DBS as a tool for Third World develop-
ment needs while simultaneously redressing the concerns of domestic
DBS opponents by limiting its application. Through NASA and its
60
legislated mandate to conduct and support research toward the gen-
eral advancement of knowledge concerning outer space, the US
executive quite possibly sought to deflect domestic anti-DBS lobbying
while appeasing pro-DBS aerospace interests.
By the end of the 1960s, the economic efficiencies and potential
cultural-power applications provided by DBS remained altogether
secondary to US policy in relation to predominant communication