Page 62 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

50 Communication, Commerce and Power

Comsat thus became the managing entity of Intelsat. 42 European
interests actively pursued this arrangement in order to maintain
some influence on what they recognized to be mutually beneficial
developments. They also supported Comsat's vision of telesatellites
being developed to complement existing cable-based infrastructures.
Both Comsat and European PITs hoped to use Intelsat in ways that
would protect most existing terrestrial-based services and related man-
ufacturing interests. However, while AT&T shared this interest in
relation to domestic developments (while also monopolizing whatever
domestic telesatellite developments were to take place), it also con-
sidered the telesatellite to be an ideal technology through which it
could outflank long-standing international undersea cable infrastruc-
tures then mostly controlled by West European interests. 43
In sum, NASA and DoD contracts to the US private sector invol-
ving rocketry and telecommunications facilitated the rapid develop-
ment of telesatellites soon after the successful launch of Sputnik.
While DoD officials made use of Soviet space achievements to express
their concerns regarding future US military power capacities, electro-
nics, computer and telecommunication equipment manufacturers all
understood that the space race could substantially increase their
receipt of short-term government procurements and long-term do-
mestic and international sales. As for the established common carriers
- dominated by AT&T - telesatellite developments were seen to be
beneficial if they complemented existing facilities. Because telesatel-
lites had the potential to circumvent or even replace significant com-
ponents of this infrastructure, carriers sought to control the pace and
direction of these developments through, for instance, their dominant
position in Comsat.
The general success of the common carriers and their retarding
influence on initial GSO system developments in part reflected the
general absence of an elaborated appreciation of the hegemonic power
potentials of telesatellites among US public sector officials. 44 As
media through which some form of state or private sector-led cultural
power could be applied, US officials - including representatives of the
USIA - understood that telesatellites could become important pro-
paganda platforms. But rather than endorsing the development of
international public or private sector broadcasting services through
telesatellites, foreign policy officials were more concerned with estab-
lishing America's world-wide leadership in new technologies (not
necessarily synonymous goals). As discussed below, within five years
of the formation of Comsat, the technological capabilities of DBS