Page 65 - Communication Commerce and Power The Political Economy of America and the Direct Broadcast Satellite

Telesatel/ite Policy and DBS, 1962-1984 53

receivers would require the transponder to generate relatively power-
ful signals. 52
The implications of this prospective technology - most notably its
reduction in both transmission costs per receiver and terrestrial infra-
structure requirements- generated widespread opposition, most voci-
ferously (and predictably) from AT&T, Comsat and established
American broadcasting interests. In 1965, Hughes Aircraft officials,
recognizing that their construction of a mass audience DBS system
would be too controversial, submitted a proposal to NASA for
funding to support the development of a medium-power DBS system
specifically designed for use by educational institutions. NASA
initially rejected the proposal without explanation but subsequently
formed joint experiments with Hughes in what was called the
Applications Technology Satellite (ATS). ATS-3, launched in 1967,
constituted the first applied quasi-DBS experiment. Hughes
executives, aware of the resistance of Comsat and other
domestic interests to its commercial application, publicized these
developments to be little more than precursors for equipment sales
to LDCs. 53
Comsat claimed that the participation of NASA in these DBS
experiments contravened the space agency's mandate. Specifically,
NASA supposedly was not permitted, directly or indirectly, to fund
prospective private sector broadcasting activities. The National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), representing US television net-
works and local stations, provided additional arguments against DBS
funding. From this period, the NAB consistently portrayed DBS as
potentially undermining both local broadcasting and the economic
viability of community programing. Other companies opposed to
public sector support for DBS included fledgling cable television
services. Their arguments were more direct, recognizing DBS as a
potential threat to the successful development of their industry. More-
over, some Congressmen again expressed concern that telesatellites-
especially DBS - could become influential propaganda tools in the
hands of 'unfriendly' nation states. By 1967, DBS proponents (mostly
representatives of aerospace companies) acknowledged that regardless
of its economic and technological efficiencies, little if any opportunity
existed for direct broadcasting to become acceptable in relation to
predominant private sector interests. NASA nevertheless continued to
fund preliminary DBS research, providing mostly small-scale laborat-
ory contracts to Hughes Aircraft, General Dynamics, General Electric
and TRW Systems. 54