Page 135 - Crisis Communication Practical PR Strategies
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            1 116 Crisis Communication

               Hydrographical Institute and the French Prevention Institute
               acted as the main initial information referents for the catas-
               trophe. The Spanish remained silent, did not react and no one
               from the government appeared at the start of the crisis to give an
               official version of the facts, the action plan adopted, etc. It
               allowed others to take the initiative and the main opposition
               party announced measures and votes of no confidence while the
               president of the Galician government was away hunting, far
               from the accident.
               Underestimating the catastrophe
               Days after the accident, the government was overwhelmed by
               events, and an unstoppable black tide marched menacingly
               towards one of the richest coasts in Spain. It was a secondary
               representative of the local government – and not the President
               himself – who had to respond to public opinion. Too late! By
               then, almost everybody had made up their own mind about the
               problem. The representative and his team of speakers devoted
               their time to minimizing the problem:

                  All the fuel that has been heading for the coast has already
                  arrived there. (Enrique L[oacute] pez Veiga, Fishing Councillor
                  of the Galician local government, 17 November 2002.)

                  At a guess, the ship could have lost between 3,000 and 4,000
                  tons of fuel. (Arsenio Fernández de Mesa, government dele-
                  gate in Galicia, 19 November 2002.) He fell short by 73,000
                  tons.

                  This is by no means a black tide. There are just some very
                  localized minor spills. (Mariano Rajoy, Vice President of the
                  Spanish government, 23 November 2002.)

               Different criteria for action
               There were different criteria for action. While the maritime
               Captain of La Coruña was asserting that tugging the vessel to
               the north was not sensible, the Minister for Public Works
               declared that he was for taking it as far as possible from the
               Spanish coast.
               Short sightedness and excess of confidence
               The government did not realize the extent of the problem and
               was not able to satisfy the media’s ‘information hunger’. The
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