Page 64 - Critical and Cultural Theory
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REPRESENTATION
     surfaces  once  more:  do  rhetorical  images evoke mental  representa-
     tions  of real  things  or  are  they  used  to  make  the false seem  true?
       The empiricist approach  to  representation  proposes  a distinction
     between  the  ways  in  which  we  interpret  nature  (i.e.  infer  the  laws
     of  nature  from  the  facts  that  it  presents  to  our  senses  and  to  our
     minds) and  the  ways in which we speculate  about  nature  (i.e. form
     subjective  images  of  it).  Speculations,  according  to  this  model,  are
     misleading: they are  fictions,  more  or  less biased  and  selective, that
     misrepresent  nature.  When  speculation  comes  into  play,  the  mind
     does  not  reflect  genuine  facts  but  rather  acts  as  a  disfiguring
     mirror.  The  idea  of  the  mind  as  a  distorting  medium  has  been
     advocated  by  several  disciplines.  Not  all  of  them,  however,  have
     followed  the  empiricist line  and  dismissed subjective mental  repre-
     sentations  as  practically  useless.  In  fact,  what  is often  emphasized
     is  not  the  notion  that  the  mind  should  be  reformed  so  as  not  to
     misrepresent  reality  but  rather  the  idea  that  misrepresentation  is
     integral  to  human  existence. Important  developments  in  the study
     of  subjectivity  carried  out  in  the  areas  of  psychoanalysis  and
     theories  of ideology,  for  instance,  have  stressed  that  misrepresenta-
     tion  plays a central role in the construction of personal  and  collec-
     tive  identities:  what  we think  we are  is often  a  product  of  how  our
     culture misrepresents us and  of how  we misrepresent ourselves. 9
       Most  importantly, misrepresentation is an  inevitable component
     of  perception.  We  always  relate  to  reality,  however  mediated  it
     may  be, as  physical bodies. This entails that  our  sense impressions
     are  bound  to  be affected  by our  material  circumstances.  Our  indi-
     vidual  faculties  and  our  surroundings impact  on  what  and  how we
     experience,  and  on  how  we  represent  what  we  experience  to  our
     minds  and  possibly  to  others.  Given  that  both  our  faculties and
     our  environment are  subject  to  contingent  variations  (to  do  with
     factors  as disparate  as  light and  climate, moods  and  dispositions),
     it  would  be  preposterous  to  assume  that  we  could  represent  the
     world  uniformly and  objectively.  Objectivity  is a  myth  designed  to
     make  us  believe that  there  is one  proper  way  of  seeing  and  repre-
     senting  reality -  and  therefore  a  means  of marginalizing  all that is



     9
     **~These  concepts  play  an  important  part  in  Jacques  Lacan's  psychoanalytic
     theories  and  in  Louis  Althusser's  writings  on  ideology.  They  are  examined  in
     detail  in Part  II,  Chapter  1, 'Ideology' and  in Part  II,  Chapter  2,  'Subjectivity'.

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