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CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 123
              this liquor-journal stand under the ruling rod of the Earl of Shaftesbury and
              that Shaftesbury is Palmerston’s son-in-law. (Marx and Engels, 1974b, p.
              124–5)

            By pointing to the various links between newspaper editors and proprietors and
            the Palmerston circle, Marx usefully underscores the need to see the ownership
            and control of communications as part of the overall structure of property and
            power relations. (As we shall see, this  is an  important point of difference
            between Marxists and the proponents of ‘the managerial revolution thesis’, who
            tend to focus on the balance of power within media corporations.) At the same
            time, however, Marx’s argument illustrates the fundamental problems with this
            kind of instrumentalist approach.
              He begins the article by asserting that the fact that the London newspapers had
            faithfully followed every twist and turn in Palmerston’s policy provides clear
            evidence of his control over the press. But this argument mistakes correlation for
            causality. By showing that there is a close correspondence between Palmerston’s
            views and press presentations, Marx simply poses the question of control; he does
            not offer an answer. Nor is one provided by his description of the economic and
            social ties linking press personnel to the Palmerston clique. While this exercise
            points to potential sources of control and influence and identifies possible sources
            along which it might flow, it does not show whether this control was actually
            exercised or how it impinged on production. This problem of inference, from
            patterns of ownership and interconnection to processes of control, has dogged
            every subsequent analysis of this type. For as Connell has rightly pointed out:

              Studies of networks of directors and family ownership provide evidence not
              of organisation itself, but of the potential for organisation. From inferring
              that they could function as systems of power within business, it is a long
              step to showing that they do. This requires a case-by-case study. (Connell,
              1977, p. 46)

            Marx himself, however, never  relied solely or even mainly on this type of
            analysis, and alongside the action-oriented strands in his work he developed a
            powerful structural approach.
              Analysis at this level is  focused not  on  the interests and activities of
            capitalists, but on  the structure  of  the capitalist economy and its underlying
            dynamics. For the purposes of structural analysis, it does not particularly matter
            who the key owners and controllers are. What is important is their location in the
            general economic system and the constraints and limits that it imposes on their
            range of feasible options. As Marx put it in a wellknown passage:

              The will of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible. What we
              have to do is not to talk about his will, but to inquire into his power, the limits
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