Page 238 - Cultures and Organizations

What Is Different Is Dangerous 211

■ When the respective roles of the members of a department become
complex, detailed job descriptions are a useful way of clarifying.
■ An organizational structure in which certain subordinates have two
direct bosses should be avoided at all costs. 40

All of these items show a dislike of ambiguity and a need for precision and
formalization in organizations in high-UAI countries. In low-UAI countries
ambiguity and chaos are sometimes praised as conditions for creativity.
Uncertainty-avoiding cultures also have a strong belief in expertise on

the work floor; their organizations contain more specialists. Uncertainty-
accepting cultures have an equally strong belief in common sense and in
generalists; a well-known example is the British tradition of considering
the study of classic literature at a good university a valid entry ticket for a
business management career.
A French study of top-management control in British, French, and
German companies by Jacques Horovitz concluded that in Britain top
managers occupied themselves more with strategic problems and less
with daily operations; in France and Germany the reverse was the case. 41
In the IBM studies, France and Germany scored considerably higher on
UAI than Britain (86 and 65, respectively, versus 35). Strategic problems,
being by definition unstructured, demand a greater tolerance for ambigu-

ity than do operational problems. During the period in which Horovitz did
his study, the French and German economies did better than the British,
so weak uncertainty avoidance leading to more strategic planning does
not necessarily increase business effectiveness. Strategic planning in these
countries is rather a matter of faith. The economic success of companies
and countries depends on many more factors.
U.S. researcher Scott Shane found that across thirty-three countries,
the number of new trademarks granted to nationals was negatively cor-

related with UAI. He concluded that uncertainty- avoiding cultures were
42
slower in innovating. Shane and his colleagues also surveyed employees of
four multinational companies in thirty countries about their roles in inno-
vation processes. In stronger uncertainty- avoidance countries, employees
more often felt constrained by existing rules and regulations. 43
A different story, however, is told by d’Iribarne. In the early 1990s
two European car manufacturers, Renault of France and Volvo of Sweden,
created a joint venture. In the IBM studies, France scored high on UAI,