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                       changing one’s own emotional and psychological state to mirror that of another. It is a
                       fundamental human mechanism for establishing emotional communication with others.
                       Siegel (1999) describes this state of communication as “feeling felt.” More discussions of
                       empathy in animals, humans, and robots can be found in Dautenhahn (1997).
                         Although work with Kismet does not directly address the question of empathy for a robot,
                       it does explore an embodied approach to understanding the affective intent of others. Recall
                       from chapter 7 that a human can induce an affective state in Kismet that roughly mirrors
                       his or her own—either through praising, prohibiting, alerting, or soothing the robot. Kismet
                       comes to “understand” the human’s affective intent by adopting an appropriate affective
                       state.
                         For technologies that must interact socially with humans, it is acknowledged that the
                       ability to perceive, represent, and reason about the emotive states of others is important. For
                       instance, the field of Affective Computing tries to measure and model the affective states
                       of humans by using a variety of sensing technologies (Picard, 1997). Some of these sensors
                       measure physiological signals such as skin conductance and heart rate. Other approaches
                       analyze readily observable signals such as facial expressions (Hara, 1998) or variations in
                       vocal quality and speech prosody (Nakatsu et al., 1999). Several symbolic AI systems, such
                       as the Affective Reasoner by Elliot, adapt psychological models of human emotions in order
                       to reason about people’s emotional states in different circumstances (Elliot, 1992). Others
                       explore computational models of emotions to improve the decision-making or learning
                       processes in robots or software agents (Yoon et al., 2000; Velasquez, 1998; Canamero,
                       1997; Bates et al., 1992). Our work with Kismet explores how emotion-like processes can
                       facilitate and foster social interaction between human and robot.
                       Autobiographic memory  This challenge problem concerns giving a robot the ability to
                       represent and reflect upon its self and its past experiences. Chapter 1 discussed autobi-
                       ographical memories in humans and their role in self-understanding. Dautenhahn (1998)
                       introduces the notion of an autobiographic agent as “an embodied agent that dynamically
                       reconstructs its individual ‘history’ (autobiography) during its lifetime.”
                         Autobiographical memory develops during the lifetime of a human being and is socially
                       constructed through interaction with others. The social interaction hypothesis states that
                       children gradually learn the forms of how to talk about memory with others and thereby learn
                       how to formulate their own memories as narratives (Nelson, 1993). Telling a reasonable
                       autobiographical story to others involves constructing a plausible tale by weaving together
                       not only the sequence of episodic events, but also one’s goals, intentions, and motivations
                       (Dautenhahn, 1999b). Cassell and Glos (1997) have shown how agent technologies could
                       be used to help children develop their own autobiographical memory through creating and
                       telling stories about themselves. A further discussion of narrative and autobiographical
                       memory as applied to robots is provided in (Dautenhahn, 1999b).
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