Page 238 - Aamir Rehman - Dubai & Co Global Strategies for Doing Business in the Gulf States-McGraw-Hill (2007)
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220                                                     Dubai & Co.



        Euromoney article, a former HSBC banker acknowledged that the
        ADIA was one of the few institutions in the world that the bank’s
        most senior executives would drop everything to visit, regardless of
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        what else they were doing. HSBC’s bankers are certainly not alone
        in recognizing the ADIA’s clout.
             The depth of the GCC states’ government investments was
        apparent in the first Gulf War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the
        Kuwaiti government fled to Saudi Arabia and Europe, and Kuwaiti
        oil production stopped. Despite having no current source of
        income, the government easily sustained itself based entirely on its
        investments. The state was also, according to insiders, able to offer
        generous support and incentive packages for business families to
        reestablish their enterprises in Kuwait once the war was over. Such
        payouts would not have been possible without significant govern-
        ment reserves.
             Besides drawing on savings, Gulf states can also issue sover-
        eign debt in the form of conventional bonds and Sharia-compliant
        Sukuk. Sukuk, often dubbed “Islamic bonds,” offer a return profile
        similar to that of bonds while using a Sharia-compliant structure
        involving leases or other asset-linked instruments. Credit ratings
        for all Gulf governments are strong, as control of energy resources
        provides a solid asset base and source of income. Sovereign debt is
        therefore a real option for GCC countries as budgetary pressures
        mount. Another rationale for sovereign debt—even in countries
        with strong fiscal positions—is that it creates a local benchmark for
        debt pricing and thereby boosts capital markets.
             Another measure that is possible but would be difficult to
        implement is increasing oil production. As the GCC states make up
        the dominant bloc within OPEC, increasing Gulf production with-
        out OPEC support could lead to large-scale noncompliance with
        OPEC quotas worldwide. For the cartel to work, the Gulf states—
        and especially Saudi Arabia—need to demonstrate commitment
        and compliance.
             The other obvious option is taxation—in the form of direct
        income taxes and less-direct sales taxes, luxury surcharges, high-
        way tolls, license fees, and similar levies. Taxation has been uncom-
        mon and hidden in the Gulf for decades now in the form of import
        duties, hotel taxes, and the like. The basic social contract has been
        one by which citizens accept a relatively limited role in political
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